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ABSTRACT 
 
Information security has become a major challenge for all private and public 
organizations.  The protection of proprietary and secret data and the proper awareness of what 
is entailed in protecting this data are necessary in all organizations.  This treatise examines how 
simulation and training would influence information security awareness over time in virtual 
communities of practice under a variety of security threats.  The hypothesis of the study was 
that security-trained members of a virtual community of practice would respond significantly 
better to routine security processes and attempts to breach security or to violate the security 
policy of their organization or of their virtual community of practice.   
Deterrence theory was used as the grounded theory and integrated in the information 
security awareness training with simulated scenarios.  The study provided training with 
simulated scenarios and then tested the users of a virtual community of practice over an 
approximately twelve-week period to see if the planned security awareness training with 
simulated security problem scenarios would be effective in improving their responses to the 
follow-up tests.   
The research subjects were divided into four groups, the experimental group and three 
control groups.  The experimental group received all of the training and testing events 
throughout the twelve-week period.  The three control groups received various portions of the 
training and testing.  The data from all of the tests were analyzed using the Kruskal-Wallis 
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ranked order test, and it was determined that there was no significant difference between the 
groups at the end of the data collection.   
Even though the null hypothesis, which stated that there would be no difference 
between the groups scores on the information security awareness tests, was not rejected, the 
groups that received the initial training with the simulated scenarios did perform slightly better 
from the pre-training test to the post-training test when compared with the control group that 
did not receive the initial training.   
More research is suggested to determine how information security awareness training 
with simulated scenarios and follow-up testing can be used to improve and sustain the security 
practices of members of virtual communities of practice.  Specifically, additional research could 
include:  comparing the effect of training with the simulated scenarios and with training that 
would not use the simulated security scenarios; the potential benefits of using adaptive and 
intelligent training to focus on the individual subjects’ weaknesses and strengths; the length of 
the training with simulated scenarios events, the time between each training event, and the 
overall length of the training; the demographics of the groups used in the training, and how 
different user characteristics impact the efficacy of the training with simulated scenarios and 
testing;  and lastly examining how increasing the fidelity of the simulated scenarios might 
impact the results of the follow-up tests. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
 
 We live in an information age that is dominated by online communications through such 
mechanisms as online affinity and network groups (e.g. Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, etc.), 
virtual online communities of practice, virtual worlds (e.g. Second Life), and other computer-
enabled mediation of knowledge sharing (Wikis, Blogs, etc.).  This treatise focuses on using 
information security awareness training with simulated security events within a virtual 
community of practice (V-CoP).   Information security training includes areas such as password 
security and maintenance, data sharing, computer viruses, and how careless information 
security practices are responsible for massive data losses and an untold number of employee 
work hours in repairing the damages.   For example, in 2003 alone computer viruses cost 
companies an estimated $45 billion (Kjaerland, 2006).   
Virtual communities exchange massive amounts of data that needs to be managed and 
stored in a secure manner, which poses a predicament for any organization.  On one hand, 
these groups are being leveraged as a new medium for intra- and inter-organizational 
knowledge sharing, and on the other hand, there has never been a larger group of potential 
computer hackers waiting to take advantage of this new target-rich virtual environment.  
Connections to organized crime have been made by the FBI for some of the illicit hacking that is 
taking place (Richardson, 2008).  Communication and sharing of knowledge and data are being 
handled by many companies through virtual communities that link people together from all 
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parts of the globe, which results in information security challenges that are not necessarily 
found in traditional non-virtual groups.   
Balancing the necessity to share information and to control access to this same 
information has been and will continue to be a challenge among the world’s businesses, 
government agencies, and other organizations.   These companies and organizations collect and 
store a vast quantity of data about their customers, products, employees, and partners.  These 
data must be safeguarded and yet still be made available.  Cost is the driving factor in this 
battle, and organizations must balance the costs of securing these data with the costs of losing 
access to and possession of their information in both quantitative and qualitative terms.    
It is difficult to assign specific financial costs to information, but much of the data that is 
collected and stored by organizations is its lifeblood, and proper protection and security is 
critical to ensure its continuity and accuracy.  A study conducted by the McAfee Corporation 
projected that companies worldwide lost more than $1 trillion to computer security breaches in 
2008 alone (Knights, 2009).   The problem of losses due to hacking has been exacerbated by the 
recent economic downturn, and the study reports that two out of five organizations surveyed 
were now more vulnerable to breaches.  Furthermore, Forrester Research estimates that an 
average computer security breach can cost a company between $90 and $305 per record 
(Gaudin, 2007).  Since most breaches do not just involve tens or even hundreds of records, but 
rather hundreds of thousands or even millions of records, the cost of the breach and the cost of 
repair can be in the millions of dollars.  For example, TJX Companies Inc. was hacked in 2007 
and a reported 46 to 215 million customer records were stolen (Hakala, 2008).  So the cost to 
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TJX could be as high as $65 billion (215 million records at $305 per record).  Questions arise 
about the causes and remedies of these breaches.  In this virtual world of computer 
transactions, how does an organization adequately protect its valuable information assets? 
Organizations all over the world need to learn how to create and implement 
information security policies and procedures to protect organizational data and to make sure 
that their employees are not only aware of these policies but that employees are tested on the 
contents of these policies as part of an ongoing process to ensure that they do not 
unnecessarily open themselves up to attack.   Security issues are particularly challenging in a V-
CoP, where members may be internal employees, external partners, the general public, and 
even competitors.  Users are a large cause of security problems within organizations, and the 
major cause of most of the worst breaches in 2007 was not from outside hackers, but rather 
from employees’ carelessness (Hakala, 2008).   
Furthermore, a large number of information security breaches are caused by human 
error or human failure when employees do not follow specified information security practices.  
Human error represents a significant threat, requiring the implementation of controls to reduce 
the frequency and severity of such mistakes (Whitman, 2004).  Lastly, when companies do not 
meet the specified requirements for data security, whether that shortcoming is willful or 
negligent, they have failed in their obligations to their stakeholders (Wilson, 2009).  Not only is 
the organization liable to its own internal users, but it is also liable to those parties with a 
financial interest (e.g. stockholders). 
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Key to this problem is awareness of security risks and the necessary education and 
training about information security.  Organizations need to increase employee training and 
awareness to avoid accidental and careless mistakes and to increase the effectiveness of their 
security policies (Whitman, 2004).  Information security awareness can be described as the 
state where users are aware of, or attentive to, their security mission as expressed in end-user 
guidelines or the security policy (Siponen, 2000).  In the 2009 Computer Security Institute’s 
(CSI)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) survey, 53 percent of the respondents said that their 
organizations allocate 5 percent or less of their overall IT budget to information security.  In 
addition, 42 percent spend less than 1 percent of their security dollars on awareness programs, 
which is an alarmingly low expenditure rate when one considers the cost of dealing with 
security breaches (Richardson, 2008).  The fact that approximately $0.50 for every $1,000 is 
spent on information security reveals the need for more focus on awareness education, 
training, and continuous and random follow-up testing.  
 One way to solve the cost issue can be through the use of simulation.  Simulation can 
be a cost-effective way to implement a solution to end-user training in proper computer 
security practices.  Included in this training with simulated scenarios would be a proper 
understanding of the common security policies that are part of the company’s standard 
operating procedures, the dangers of not adhering to good security practices, and scenarios 
that test the users’ understanding of the information security topics presented.  Simulation has 
been effectively used in other areas such as automobile traffic routing and design and in the 
education field through simulated labs and experiments.  Simulation has been used by almost 
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every other sector of society to train employees and to test solutions before they are 
implemented. 
Information security starts with the policies and procedures that an organization adopts 
for protecting their valuable data.   According to Whitman, a security policy is the single most 
important issue for protecting a computer system or network from hackers (Whitman, 2004).  
Also, Sword and Shield Security Consultants (2001) found that implementation of a security 
policy is the number one recommended action for protecting an organization’s IT systems.  The 
policy should outline both individual and corporate responsibilities, define authorized and 
unauthorized use of systems, report threats and breaches, and define penalties for violating the 
policy.  The policy should also include a method for updating the policy.  Key to these policies is 
the balance of providing confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Blake, 2000).  The 
cornerstone of the information security policy is ensuring that data is kept private 
(confidentiality), that the data can be relied upon to be accurate (integrity), and accessible only 
by authorized (and authenticated) individuals in a timely and available manner.  Security 
policies have long been seen as the key to identifying and managing the security threats and 
the resources needed to secure information and the systems that hold that data (Anderson, 
1996).   
In a virtual environment, security poses a serious challenge as part of the problem is the 
enormous amount of data that is available.  Proper utilization and assimilation of collected data 
can be accomplished through the informal and formal organization of employees in virtual 
groups that are connected through a shared practice.  Such a group, as coined by Wenger and 
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Lave (Wenger, 1999), is called a community of practice (CoP).  A CoP is a group of people 
informally bound together by some shared passion for a joint enterprise (Wenger & Snyder, 
2000).  A V-CoP is a CoP that is convened and meets in a virtual environment where members 
may never meet in person. 
Ultimately what is needed is a new model that incorporates the nuances from a V-CoP 
where the boundaries, topics of discussion, and membership of the CoP may change on a daily 
basis (Wenger, 2000).  A new model would include a comprehensive security awareness 
program that incorporates initial training for individuals that are members of a V-CoP and 
ongoing monitoring and periodic testing.  Included with the random testing of members of the 
V-CoP will be mock security incident testing (Baker, 2008) to make sure that the members are 
adhering to the security policy they agreed to, are educated about, and are tested on (see 
Appendix E for a training syllabus).  Part of this process is to educate the members of the V-CoP 
on the potential threats and damages that can be caused by careless behavior that 
compromises computer security and may lead to financial and other losses.   
The simulated mock security events would be part of the training and consist of a 
simulated security incident, such as a counterfeit email, which asks the member of the V-CoP to 
reveal confidential data or other proprietary information within the safety of a designed 
simulated security event.  The member then would have to properly respond to the simulated 
scenario within the web-based environment.  This simulated mock security incident would be a 
planned part of the initial training and then would consist of follow-up training events that 
would occur periodically on an ongoing basis to test the end-users’ awareness of the security 
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policy.  If they do not respond appropriately to subsequent events, they will be presented with 
follow-up training tips via the web portal to remind them of the proper application of a typical 
security policy.  A sufficient passing rate would be determined by the type of organization that 
the end-user works for and the level of data access associated with the end-user.  For example, 
in a classified environment like military intelligence or the research and development 
department of a corporation, the passing rate may be 100%.  However, in another environment 
where the data is not as sensitive, the passing rate could be lower.  
 
Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study 
 
 The theoretical basis for this study is deterrence theory.  Originally coined from the cold 
war era of potential mutual destruction between the US and the USSR, the theory is based 
upon the premise that one party will not engage in aggressive behavior if the opponent has the 
ability and will to retaliate with the same or superior force, and it should include the 
understanding of what an adversary values (Nautilus, 1995).  Since its original application to 
nuclear deterrence, scholars have applied the theory to the prevention of criminal activity.  If 
an organization understands what an adversary values (e.g. financial data, or any data that can 
easily be turned into monetary gain), then it can spend more of its limited resources on 
protecting those assets, and if the adversary perceives a high likelihood of detection and 
capture, then the probability of the attack should diminish. 
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The focus of this research is on how deterrence theory can be applied to information 
security by properly educating V-CoP participants on the destruction and harm that computer 
hackers can cause by the lack of end-user adherence to standard computer security policy 
practices.   
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
 While much has been done in the field of computer security and in determining 
different ways to deter information system abuse, the application of deterrence theory to V-
CoPs has not been explored.  Users are usually unaware of the risks of careless or reckless 
behaviors and their negative impact on information security.  Members of a V-CoP must be 
aware of not only the type and sensitivity of the data they are posting or discussing in an online 
forum, but they need to be able to identify the recipient on the other end, or at least have an 
understanding about what type of access is enforced throughout the network of the V-CoP.   
End users must be properly trained and educated on security awareness practices since they 
are the major problem in information security for any organization. 
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Purpose of the Study 
 
 The purpose of this study was to determine if security awareness training with 
simulated security events and follow-up testing would have a positive effect on the members of 
a V-CoP.    
Four groups were used in the study, three control groups (labeled B, C, and D), and one 
experimental group (labeled A).  Groups A, B, and C received a pre-training test to check their 
knowledge and understanding of normal security procedures; Group D did not.  Group B 
received no advanced security awareness training but was presented with the mock simulated 
security scenarios with follow-up testing to measure their responses to the training.  Control 
Group C received the initial training but did not receive any follow-up training.  Group A and 
control Group C received the security awareness training, approximately one to two weeks 
after the pre-training test and then were presented with the mock security scenarios and 
testing (see Appendix F for examples of the simulated security scenarios).  Groups A and B were 
evaluated on their responses to the security scenarios.  Approximately 3, 6, and 9 weeks after 
the initial training and test, Groups A and B were presented with another training event with a 
simulated security scenario and were then tested and their responses were measured and 
recorded.  The responses were then compared with the responses recorded in the initial pre-
training test and post-training test. At approximately 12 weeks a final test was delivered to all 
four groups that was identical to the pre-training test.  The hypothesis was that the users who 
received the training with simulated security events would have a higher score on the post-
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training test versus the pre-training test.  It was also hypothesized that the subjects who did not 
receive the training would have similar scores on the pre- and post-training tests.  Follow-up 
interviews were considered but not warranted based on the homogeneity of the groups 
involved in the study.  Data gathered from the tests and events may be presented to the 
institutions involved to provide feedback on how they may need to change their security policy 
and procedures. 
 
Outline of Treatise 
 
 Chapter 2 includes a comprehensive literature.  How the experiment was designed, 
what methodology was used, and what data was collected was discussed in Chapter 3.  The 
data collection methods and the statistical results are presented in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 
presents conclusions, recommendations and observations related to future study and research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
Information security in V-CoPs has been largely ignored.  Members of a V-CoP must rely 
on the protections that have been implemented and assume that these protections are 
sufficient.  However, many users do not even consider the proprietary nature of the data and 
information that they are sharing, nor are they sure of who is at the other end of the 
communication channel.  Understanding computer security is important, but most users do not 
have the time or the inclination to learn or keep up to date.  Lack of security awareness is a 
troubling problem as end-users are the primary cause of most computer breaches (Hakala, 
2008).  Even though end-users are the major cause of information security breaches, proper 
security controls accompanied by security awareness education can help to diminish this trend 
(Whitman, 2004).   
Through security awareness education/training, through the application of deterrence 
theory, the members of a V-CoP will not only be more aware of information security issues, but 
they will be more likely to spot a potential security breach.  Through deterrence theory 
application, members will be educated on the potential damage that can be done by a 
malicious hacker and the substantial costs.  Also, members will be made aware of common 
techniques and issues in information security.   
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This chapter examines CoPs and V-CoPs.  Research in these areas is examined with a 
focus on information security.  Next, information security and information security breaches are 
discussed.  Lastly, information security policies, taxonomy of security breaches, and computer 
security awareness training are discussed.  
 
Communities of Practice 
 
According to Wenger, “communities of practice are groups of people who share a 
concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact 
regularly”, (Wenger, 1999).  They are formed by people who “engage in a process of collective 
learning in a shared domain of human endeavor” (Wenger, 1999).  Some of the unique features 
of CoPs are their self-organizing nature and how they can spontaneously appear almost 
anywhere and in almost any format (Sharratt, 2003).  CoPs have been around as long as 
humans have learned together and can be found in almost every discipline.  Most recently, the 
concept has been adopted by business due to the valuable nature of knowledge and 
information.  Any group that seeks to learn within a shared domain (accounting, supply chain 
management, fishing techniques, etc.) can therefore be considered to be a CoP (Barth, 2004).  
According to Wenger, there are three components that constitute a CoP, and these three 
components are developed in parallel (Wenger, 1999).  They are the domain, the community, 
and the practice. 
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 The domain is the “shared domain of interest” of the group of people that are 
involved.  A member of a CoP implies a certain level of commitment and 
competence to the domain.  This distinguishes members of the CoP over others 
that may or may not be part of the domain. 
 The community is the group of people who interact and learn from each other.  
They engage in joint activities and discussions, help each other, and share 
information.  They may or may not work together on a daily basis, they are 
geographically dispersed or even work for different organizations. 
 The practice is a developed set of stories and cases, a shared repertoire that is 
used in a CoP.  The “practice” takes time and sustained interaction between the 
members.  The development of a shared practice may be intentional or 
unintentional. 
CoPs can be classified into four different models.  They can be internal CoPs, CoPs in 
network organizations, formal networks of practice, and self-organizing networks of practice 
(Coakes, 2005).  Internal CoPs are entirely within individual organizations.  For example, IBM’s 
Global Services organization has over 60 CoPs with a total of 20,000 members across most of 
the countries that it serves.  These communities handle explicit knowledge, adopt roles for 
handling this knowledge, and provide opportunities for sharing tacit knowledge (Coakes, 2005).   
A network organization is a relationship between independent organizations (Powell, 
1990).  An example of this type of network is a supply chain.  Members of these organizations 
work in close and ongoing cooperation on projects or processes (Coakes, 2005).  The problem 
with this type of network is there is always the risk of knowledge leakage, which is an obvious 
security issue (Sampson, 2004).   
14 
 
Networks of practice are extra-organizational CoPs that are focused on work practice 
primarily through electronic communication.  Network CoPs can be useful for solving problems 
in a certain discipline across organizations.  However, this model can also have issues with 
security issues related to proprietary knowledge.   
Lastly, a self-organizing network of practice is a loosely organized and informal network 
that has no central authority, and membership is voluntary. 
CoPs are valuable to organizations since knowledge has long been recognized as a 
valuable resource for growth and competitive advantage (Johnson, 2001; Sharratt, 2003; 
Wasko, 2005; Wenger, 2003).  A main reason for the increase in interest in CoPs is 
dissatisfaction with traditional learning methods and arenas (Johnson, 2001).  The successes of 
today’s organizations depend not on a divide and conquer strategy, but rather on sharing 
knowledge, which is the purpose of a CoP (Neus, 2001).  The more that knowledge exchange 
can properly occur within an organization, the more efficient the organization can be.  
Knowledge exchange can also diminish the loss of information through employee attrition 
(Wenger, 2004).   As employees share knowledge with others, new knowledge is created and 
added to the knowledge repository of the organization.  This knowledge is collected and 
becomes part of the knowledge base of the organization.  These knowledge bases are managed 
by knowledge management systems.   
Knowledge management is the systematic approach for sustainably improving the 
handling of knowledge on all levels of an organization in order to support the organization’s 
business goals, such as innovation, quality, cost effectiveness, etc (Boella, and van der Torre, 
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2006).    Knowledge is the result of different perspectives and partial interpretations of world 
portions or domains, called the subjectivity and sociality of knowledge, and therefore, it should 
not be viewed as an absolute monolithic matter, but as a “system of local ‘knowledges’ 
continuously negotiated by communities of ‘knowers’” (Boella, and van der Torre, 2006). 
Knowledge management systems (KMS) have been touted as critical tools for sharing of 
information, and in an ideal setting, this would be true.  Knowledge by itself that is transferred 
solely through electronic reproduction can fall short of its potential if the knowledge is not 
placed in context and if employees do not know the “story” behind the knowledge (Wasko, 
2005; Wenger, 2004).  Organizations must also realize that this knowledge is not just a group of 
facts that appear in a spreadsheet or other explicit knowledge which is easier to transmit but 
more difficult to safeguard (Coakes, 2005).  Knowledge, to a large extent, is embedded in 
individuals.  It is inseparable from people in its fullest and most valuable form when it can be 
placed in context, exchanged in a meaningful way, clarified as needed, and applied in a useful 
method (Wasko, 2005).  Extended even further, when knowledge is managed and shared within 
a community that knowledge supersedes the individual (Wenger, 1999).   Transfer of tacit 
knowledge is critical to an organization and requires that an individual passes on this 
knowledge in context, and with relevant historical background (how was the knowledge 
acquired, from where, etc.) (Ardichvili, 2003; Wasko and Faraj 2005; Wenger, 2003; Sharratt, 
2003). 
How do organizations get employees to share their knowledge in a community, 
particularly when it is done over communication systems like the internet?  Wasko and Faraj 
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(2005) found that people participate primarily out of “community interest, generalized 
reciprocity, and pro-social behavior”.  Another study found that V-CoP members’ willingness to 
share are based on factors such as ease of use and perceived usefulness of the knowledge 
management system, trust (how well does one member trust the other members), perceived 
proximity of knowledge sharing to career advancement, sense of community, and perceived 
value congruence (Sharratt, 2003).  Lastly, members of CoPs have been found to share when 
they perceive that it will enhance their professional reputation, when they have the experience 
to share, and when they are part of the network of members (Wasko and Faraj, 2005).  As trust 
is a major contributor to “sharing” knowledge in a CoP, offering a more secure environment will 
contribute to sharing, the overall effectiveness of the community, and in reality contribution to 
the bottom line (even in a non-profit organization). 
What is challenging when it comes to security in a CoP is the scope or reach of the 
community.  A CoP can be internal to an organization, can include external partners, and can be 
open to a variety of public members.  The “practitioners” involved in a community of practice 
and the nature of the shared data will greatly influence the level of security that is needed in a 
CoP.   
 
Virtual Communities of Practice 
 
Traditional communities are place-based and have membership according to norms.  
The community usually clearly defines who is a member and who is not.  In contrast, virtual 
communities exist according to identification to an idea or task, rather than place.  V-CoPs are 
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organized around an activity, and they are formed as a need arises (Squires and Johnson, 2000).    
Virtual communities do not need formal boundaries for they can be fluid.   Norms do not 
dominate in V-CoPs, in contrast to more traditional CoPs, which allows for greater individual 
control.  In a V-CoP, the Internet becomes the place for the community.  V-CoPs have increased 
the parameters of what is known as a community (Palloff and Pratt, 1999).  Both virtual 
communities and CoPs have life cycles.  Palloff and Pratt (1999) outline five stages of the life 
cycle of community development: forming, norming, storming, performing, and adjourning.  
Thus, in CoPs and V-CoPs “language, practices, customs, and resources develop over time” 
(Squire and Johnson, 2000). 
The definition of a V-CoP is similar to a traditional CoP, the primary difference being that 
a V-CoP is a group separated by space and time that uses networked technologies in one form 
or another to collaborate and communicate.  The members of the V-CoP will almost certainly 
use the community’s artifacts (technology, processes, symbols, pictures, policies, etc.) 
(Johnson, 2001).  V-CoPs can consist of a larger, loosely knit group of individuals engaged in a 
shared practice who may not expect to meet face-to-face and who may not know each other 
(Wasko and Faraj, 2005).  Even though members may not ever meet face-to-face, they are able 
to share a great deal of knowledge.  Like CoPs, V-CoPs can be self organizing groups and open 
activity systems focused on a shared practice.  V-CoPs may be predetermined and by-invitation-
only groups.  Some of these groups exist as both open activity systems and by-invitation-only 
systems, a common trait in systems where certain types of information are made available to 
the public at large, and core or invited members must use a password, or be part of an access 
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control list (ACL) that permits their access to restricted data that is deemed more sensitive than 
public access data (Anderson, 1996). 
V-CoPs, like any other network environment, must adhere to the same rules as a 
traditional network infrastructure found in any business environment.  The policies and 
procedures implemented must follow standard and well formed practices (SANS.org, 2005).  
However, like any other virtual environment, proper education and training must be done to 
ensure that users do not compromise sensitive data, nor unwillingly disclose information or 
knowledge that would negatively impact their organization or their personal lives.   
 
Deterrence Theory 
 
There are two forms of deterrence theory, classical and contemporary (Higgins, 2005).  
The classical form assumes that individuals are rational beings and, therefore, think and act in a 
rational manner.  Also, they perform behaviors they perceive as pleasurable or beneficial and 
avoid behaviors they perceive as painful or costly in either financial or physical terms.  Key to 
this theory is an individual’s belief that illicit behavior will be detected, will be harshly punished, 
and will be quickly resolved.  Therefore, when the threat of punishment is perceived by the 
potential perpetrator to be certain, severe, and swift, the perceived cost of an illicit behavior 
increases, triggering caution in the individual who could refrain from the behavior, thereby 
deterring and reducing the illicit behavior.  By demonstrating that certainty rather than severity 
was the most important deterrent measure, the research suggests that classical deterrence 
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theory is not a complete enough model to understand what deters individuals from crime 
(Higgins, 2005).  If an organization has put in place proper levels of deterrents and has properly 
educated its employees, there will be a reduced likelihood of breach by external hackers.  
Deterrence theory can be of further use when the users of a system, like a V-CoP, are educated 
on the potential costs associated with breaches in secure data.  There should be a heightened 
sensitivity to security policy measures and practices.   
Contemporary deterrence theory recognizes the various problems with classical 
deterrence theory, such as assuming that people are rational beings who avoid performing acts 
that have a high negative cost.  However, research has shown that people are more likely to 
avoid performing illicit acts, such as computer hacking, if there is a high probability of being 
caught instead of on the actual punishment for the act (Higgins, 2005).  Contemporary 
deterrence theory enhances the classical theory through the addition of other measures that 
represent inhibitions and motivations for illicit acts (Higgins, 2005). For example, Grasmick and 
Bursik (1990) suggest that including conscience measures, such as shame and guilt, contributes 
to the understanding of how to deter people from illicit behavior.  Grasmick and Bursik (1990) 
more specifically suggest that “an understanding of the level of self-disapproval would 
demonstrate inhibitory effects on illicit behavior, because of the self-stigmatizing implications 
they provide”.  
With the rising incidents of computer abuse, organizations are searching for better 
methods of deterrence.  Based on the general application of deterrence theory, organizations 
can reduce computer abuse by implementing standard security policy measures such as anti-
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virus systems, password protection schemes, rigorous enforcement of computer security 
policies, and fostering security awareness in employees through special security education (Lee, 
2003). 
Classical deterrence theory explains how security measures implemented by 
organizations rely primarily on the technology used to protect information systems without 
considering other factors, such as people issues and processes that are in place that may be a 
security weakness.  In particular, Eloff and von Solms (2000) provide a hierarchical framework 
for security management. Their framework includes two major elements: technology and 
processes.  However, they do not include another piece of the security puzzle, the human 
aspect (Lee, 2003).   A recent joint study by CSI and the FBI documents that the most serious 
losses in companies are committed by unauthorized insider access (Richardson, 2008).  Dhillon 
and Backhouse (2001) pointed out that information security is a social and organizational issue 
because people use the system. Thus, it is the humans interacting with, and responsible for 
systems that have the biggest impact on the security of individual systems and the organization 
or V-CoP.  
Deterrence theory can be applied to information security in a number of ways.   
Breaches can occur from inside or outside an organization.  Usually, insider breaches arise from 
legitimate users violating a standard computer security policy.  However, malicious breaches 
may be perpetrated from within the organization but also, and more often, from outside the 
organization.  If the focus is on the computer attacker, which will be referred to as a malicious 
hacker, then deterrence theory can be used to create an environment where the malicious 
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hacker risks such severe penalties that considering hacking the system is not worth the 
potential risks of being caught.  Also, if the malicious hacker perceives that there is a high 
probability of being discovered and caught, there is a higher likelihood that the malicious 
hacker will avoid the risk of detection for more target rich environments.  If the focus is on the 
legitimate user of the system, for example, a member of a V-CoP, then properly educating the 
user on the potential outcomes of not strictly following security policies and procedures may 
help to motivate the user to follow the policies and procedures.   
 
Information Security (InfoSec) 
 
Computer security or information security (InfoSec) is becoming a more complex issue 
as organizations store a vast array of data that can range from general sales data to top secret 
military information.  Further complicated by virtual environments and the communication that 
takes place over the ether, computer security has become a key subject of interest within 
organizations.  Changes in the way organizations share and store data provides for an 
environment where opportunistic hackers can take advantage of data repositories that are 
available online and data transmission between remote sites by virtual members of online 
communities such as V-CoPs.  The AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) 
clearly identified InfoSec controls as the number one issue of the top ten technology issues 
(Cryton and Tie, 2001).  Also, information security is a business issue and not a technical issue 
(Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004).  Lastly, information security governance is a multi-
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dimensional discipline.  Information security governance is a complex issue, there is no silver 
bullet or single ‘off the shelf’ solution (von Solms and von Solms, 2004).    
InfoSec is concerned with confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  Confidentiality has 
been the primary focus, but Clark and Wilson argue that the integrity of information is more 
important than its confidentiality.  Integrity is defined as “information is not modified in 
unauthorized ways, that it is internally consistent and consistent with the real-world objects 
that it represents, and that the system performs correctly” (Blake, 2000).  The Clark-Wilson 
model includes two important principles of integrity.  The principle of separation of duty 
specifies that no single person should perform a task from beginning to end.  Any task should 
be performed by at least two people to avoid fraud by one person acting alone.  The principle 
of well-formed transaction is defined as a transaction where the user is unable to manipulate 
data arbitrarily, but only in constrained ways that preserve or ensure the integrity of the data.  
The three goals of integrity are to prevent unauthorized modifications, to maintain internal and 
external consistency, and to prevent authorized but improper modifications.  The Clark-Wilson 
Model divides data into two categories – constrained and unconstrained data items.  
Constrained data items (CDI) are data items for which the integrity model is applied and 
unconstrained data items (UDI) are not covered by the model (Blake, 2000).  It is useful in 
constructing a V-CoP security policy to know which type of shared data would be considered 
CDI and which would be UDI.  Knowing the necessity of data integrity is an important part of a 
virtual community. 
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Another model, the Bell-Lapuda model, focuses on data confidentiality and access to 
data that is classified.  The entities in this model are divided into subjects and objects within the 
information system.   A secure state or ideal state is defined and proven, and then each state 
transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state.  Throughout a virtual 
communication exchange, as found in V-CoPs, the model is built on the concept of a state 
machine with a set of allowable states or positions that enable the secure execution of data 
sharing. The transition from one state to another state is defined by transition functions.  A 
system state is defined to be "secure" if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects 
are in accordance with a security policy. To determine whether a specific access mode is 
allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object to determine 
if the subject is authorized for the specific access model (Bell, 2005).  Ultimately, what the 
model strives to achieve is a consistent determination of security based on a set of prescribed 
rules and procedures.  In a V-CoP, what is important is the assurance of how data is shared, and 
how users interact with each other in a secure environment, not violating the security policies 
of their organization. 
When examining security models in the context of virtual communications and virtual 
data repositories, as found in a V-CoP, computer security should be addressed first and 
foremost from the user perspective.  The end-user is usually an operations employee that uses 
the system for daily work, but could also refer to senior executives, as they have the 
responsibility for ensuring that proper data security measures are implemented and that the 
personnel responsible for managing data security have adequate preparation and training 
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(SANS.ORG, 2005).  It is true that end-users make mistakes on a regular basis that can lead to 
security breaches and they are a major cause of security problems within an organization.  End-
users are unintentionally contributing to the success of computer hackers by failing to follow 
routine basic computer security policies (SANS.ORG, 2005; Hakala, 2008).  End-users ignorance 
can be tragic in a virtual environment where users may be located anywhere across the world 
and the security safeguards in place may vary from place to place. 
Human error is the major cause of most computer breaches, including such simple 
errors as the improper securing of laptops, backup tapes, and disks (Baker, 2008; Hakala, 2008; 
McGlasson, 2008; Whitman, 2004).  One specific example involves a laptop that was stolen 
from an NIH researcher containing the unencrypted details of over 2,500 patients involved in a 
clinical trial (Greenemeier, 2008).  In a V-CoP, data is often downloaded and stored on portable 
devices so proper security of these devices is critical.   It is plain to see that proper security 
procedures need to be followed to avert such potential calamities.  What is unfortunate is that 
information management systems are traditionally developed without any security 
considerations, for example, because the users of the systems know each other, share the same 
goal, and share a fixed set of administrative rules which is not necessarily true in today’s 
environment (Boella and van der Torre, 2006). 
Security issues are common because users fail to perform basic information security 
policy tasks such as installing and keeping up to date anti-virus software on their systems 
(SANS.org, 2005).  End-users make the mistake of opening email attachments without properly 
checking the source and content of the file.  If the end-users back up their files, they neglect to 
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test the backup to make sure that the backup was successfully made.  Lastly, they may be 
connected to a wireless network and still connect to the network or Internet using a modem, 
which can result in numerous security issues because the end-user may be inadvertently 
circumventing the system security features that are in place (SANS.ORG, 2005).  These issues 
can severely affect the operations of a V-CoP by unknowingly spreading computer viruses, 
Trojans, or other InfoSec threats.   
There is a need for greater levels of awareness, education, and security policy 
information within organizations (Whitman, 2004).  Even though many companies have a 
security policy in place, there are inconsistencies and users are not regularly trained or tested 
on security risks and threats.  There is also confusion over who controls the data that is stored 
in the information systems of the organization (Yampolskiy, and Govindaraju, 2007) which 
would include access to shared data in a V-CoP since the data may be stored on the same 
servers.  Key to this research is not only the education of users to the potential disasters that 
can occur through every day events such as making sure they keep their password secret, 
logging off or locking their computers when leaving their office space, backing up important 
data files, etc., but also, how to avoid security breaches at all.  Even with today’s security 
improvements, the hackers are staying one step ahead of the security system manufacturers.    
V-CoP end-user security issues help to support the notion of properly educating these 
same end-users on the issues involved in lack of adherence to the organization’s security policy.  
If end-users are properly educated on the risks and potential damage that can be done by 
hackers, they will be more likely to follow the organization’s security policy.   Deterrence 
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education has been found to be effective in keeping outsiders and insiders from attempting to 
hack or misuse a system.  Hoffer and Straub (1990) found that deterrents have been effective in 
lowering computer abuse.  However, proper reporting of incidences must also be part of the 
security process.  In fact, another study found that computer abusers were often discovered by 
accident, through normal system controls and purposeful detection.  But, only 9% of abuses 
were reported to outside agencies (partly due to ignorance).  More specifically, 90% of 
respondents feared negative publicity if they reported; 75% felt that competition would use 
this information against them; and 54% of respondents did not know they could report the 
incidences (Richardson, 2003).  So not only do organizations need to provide education to end-
users and proper deterrents to prevent computer abuse, but also a clear policy on reporting 
abuses.   
Points and Causes of Security Breaches 
 
Unfortunately, there are many causes that lead to security breaches within a system, 
with human error being the key aspect.  In the 2003 CSI/FBI survey, respondents cited their 
Internet connection as a frequent point of attack, up from 74% in 2002 to 78% in 2003 
(Whitman, 2004).  Furthermore, the CSI/FBI survey revealed the following threats to 
information security:  
 Act of human error or failure (e.g. accidents or employee mistakes).* 
 
 Compromises to intellectual property (e.g. piracy, copyright infringement).* 
 
 Deliberate acts of espionage or trespass (e.g. unauthorized access and/or 
data collection).* 
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 Deliberate acts of information extortion (e.g. blackmail of information 
disclosure). 
 
 Deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism (e.g. destruction of systems or 
information). 
 
 Deliberate software attacks (e.g. viruses, worms, macros, denial of service).* 
 
 Quality of service deviations from service providers.  
 
 Technical hardware failures or errors (e.g. equipment failure) 
 
 Technical software failures or errors (bugs, code problems, unknown 
loopholes).* 
 
 Technological obsolescence (antiquated or outdated technologies).* 
 
*More closely relates to V-CoP 
Almost all of these threats would apply to a V-CoP.  Accidents made by employees of the 
system could impact the V-CoP by not properly virus checking a document before uploading it 
to the system or by placing confidential data in an open forum where anyone can view the data.  
One example is when Kaiser Permanente accidentally posted patient medical records and test 
results on a public area of a corporate site several years ago (Rosencrance, 2005).  Compromises 
to intellectual property are always a risk through plagiarism and misquoting of source data 
posted to a V-CoP.  It is important that the members of the V-CoP can fully trust the 
information that is permanently posted to the V-CoP site.   
The top security threat for over 8 years is virus attacks and the fourth ranked threat was 
DOS (denial of service), which are deliberate software attacks (Whitman, 2004).    These can be 
particularly hazardous to a V-CoP as a software virus innocuously embedded into a shared file 
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could easily be replicated to all of the systems of the members of the V-CoP.  Employee 
mistakes and failures to follow policy represent a dominant threat requiring the 
implementation of controls to reduce the frequency and severity of such attacks. Respondents 
to the CSI/FBI survey stated that they spent the most money on human mistakes, technical 
problems, and service-provider problems (Richardson, 2008).  Virus incidents occurred most 
frequently in about 50% of the respondents’ organizations.  Next, insider abuse was around 
44% followed by physical theft (e.g. laptops, etc.) at 42%.  Even in the medical community, 11% 
of general practitioners in Great Britain experienced computer theft (Anderson, 1996).   About 
1 in 10 reported a domain name system (DNS) incident, which was up 2% from the previous 
year.  Over 25% reported being victims of a “targeted attack”, meaning an attack aimed 
specifically at their organization from an outside hacker.  Of reporting organizations, 68% said 
they had or were developing a formal information security policy, with only 1% stating that they 
did not have a policy (Richardson, 2008).   
The 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report (Baker, et.al., 2008) discovered that more 
than half of the over 500 data breaches researched required little or no skill to perpetrate.  The 
computer hackers utilized tools easily downloadable from the internet to commit their illicit 
acts.  Basic run-of-the-mill tools and precautions would have prevented these hacks from 
occurring (Richardson, 2008).  Furthermore, Richardson found that the four categories of 
highest incidence are viruses, insider abuse, laptop theft, and unauthorized access to systems.   
In the medical world, software bugs could alter the numbers in a laboratory report without 
changing it so grossly that it would be rejected, and viruses have already destroyed clinical 
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information (Anderson, 1996).  Concern has also been expressed that the lack of standards in 
clinical EDI (electronic data interchange) may lead to data being interpreted incorrectly or 
differently by different systems, with potentially life-threatening effect (Anderson, 1996).   
Most breaches resulted from a combination of events rather than a single action (Baker, 
2008).  He found that 90% of known vulnerabilities exploited by these attacks had patches 
available for at least 6 months prior to the breach.  Investigators concluded that nearly all 
breaches would likely have been prevented if basic security controls had been in place at the 
time of the attack.  Members of a V-CoP are likely targets since they primarily use virtual 
communications that often take place over network connections that utilize the public network.  
What makes most security breaches complex is that they resulted from multiple intra-category 
events, meaning the hackers had utilized several types of techniques and/or tools and many 
encompassed several threat categories (Baker, 2008).  Security breaches are a particularly 
dangerous situation in online communities as hackers with little or no skill can launch 
sophisticated attacks against sites and systems with readily available free software.  Software 
such as LophtCrack, a brute force password attack tool, and VisualRoute, a legitimate tool that 
reveals information about a site such as the registrant of the domain name, IP address, range, 
and more, are routinely used to hack or gather information about a site so that it can be 
hacked.  Members of V-CoPs must be aware of the ease of attack and adjust their online 
behavior to reflect a higher level of caution and awareness.   
Hacking leads to more data breaches than any other category by a margin of two to one.  
The types of hacking are broken down as follows: application/service layer = 39%, OS/platform 
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layer = 23%, exploits known vulnerability = 18%, use of back door = 15%, exploits unknown 
vulnerability = 5%.  A patch deployment strategy focusing on coverage and consistency is far 
more effective at preventing data breaches than fire drills attempting to patch particular 
systems as soon as patches are released (Baker, 2008).  Results suggest that management 
needs to (1) become more informed of the potential for security breaches, (2) increase their 
awareness in key areas, and (3) recognize that their overall level of concern for security may 
underestimate the potential risk inherent in the highly connected environment in which they 
operate’’  (Loch et al.,1992).  Application of these procedures is key not only to the organization 
as a whole, but to the V-CoPs that are operating throughout an organization and their partners. 
Hackers Geographic Location and International Issues 
 
An increasing number of hackers are becoming organized around the world, making it 
more difficult for law enforcement to prosecute these hackers and bring them to justice 
(McGlasson, 2008).  In the case of TJX (parent company of the TJ Maxx chain of retail stores), 
only 3 of the 11 defendants lived in the United States (McGlasson, 2008).  With the advent of 
the connected world through the internet and specifically the World Wide Web, a computer 
hacker can live anywhere in the world and launch attacks with relative anonymity and with 
almost no cost.   
Computer ethics studies have found that individuals from differing origins had 
somewhat different perspectives with regard to computer ethics (Whitman et al., 1999).  It is 
important to use caution when placing expectations on individuals from other cultures 
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regarding their ethical performance.  Managers must attempt to understand their perspectives 
and educate them on the organization’s perspectives (Whitman, M. 2004). 
Cost of Security Breaches 
 
A study by Forrester Research has estimated that an average security breach can cost a 
company between $90 and $305 per record.  Included in the costs are legal feels, call center 
time, lost productivity, regulatory fines, stock price loss, and customer losses (Gaudin, 2007).  
Even so, it is difficult to put a price tag on a security breach, and according to the survey, as 
many as 25% of the companies did not know, or do not know, how to put a price on the cost of 
a breach.  Some losses can be so significant that it can put a company out of business.  Kark 
found that discovery, response, and notification costs were averaged out to be about $50 per 
lost record.  The cost of record loss has increased primarily due to lost employee productivity 
and increased public attention.   
The 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey found that the most expensive 
security breaches were for financial fraud, with an annual average loss estimated at almost 
$500,000 per incident.  Next were “bot” computers (computers unknowingly running software 
programs that can cause or are causing security holes) within the organization’s network with a 
loss estimate of almost $350,000 per incident (Richardson, 2008). The average loss per 
respondent was $288,618, down from $345,005 in the previous year, but up from the low of 
$167,713.  Financial fraud costs the most at an average of $463,100 per incident, followed by 
bot computers reported to cost $345,600.  Loss of customer and employee confidential data 
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averaged $241,000 and $268,000, respectively.  Virus costs were down and cost on average 
only $40,141 per incident – which is somewhat encouraging since this is the most common type 
of security breach (Richardson, 2008).  Even though virus costs were down per incident, in 2002 
the worldwide cost of worms and viruses was estimated at $45 billion and in 2003 the costs had 
risen to $45 billion by August (Kjaerland, 2006).  Viruses lead to other breaches and are easily 
replicable across networks.  The vast quantities of virus infections have lead to this extremely 
large dollar cost and there is little sign of a significant decrease in sight (Kjaerland, 2006). 
Security Awareness and Training 
 
Organizations need to increase employee training and awareness to avoid accidental 
and careless mistakes.  According to Hoffer and Straub (1989), deterrence is most effective 
when the subject has a realistic expectation of apprehension, a fear of the sanctions, and 
reasonable expectation that the sanctions will be applied.   Organizations must, however, be 
aware of the toll that excessive preventative measures can play on the performance of a system 
and/or application (Whitman, 2004).  
Feedback from 522 computer security professionals found that 53 percent of the 
respondents said that their organizations allocated 5 percent or less of their overall IT budget to 
information security, and 42 percent spend less than 1 percent of their security dollars on 
awareness programs (Richardson, 2008).  Spending only 1 percent is an alarmingly low 
expenditure rate when one considers the cost of dealing with security breaches and is a 
problem that can either mean that companies are not taking awareness seriously or they do 
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not think that it is worth the effort.  In the same survey, companies were asked about the 
measures that they use to gauge the effectiveness of their security awareness programs.  Only 
18% of companies do not use awareness training at all, which is good news.  About 4 of 5 
organizations do some type of awareness training regarding security risks and appropriate 
handling of sensitive data.  However, 32% make no effort to measure the effect of this training 
on their organization (Richardson, 2008).  Furthermore, there was no mention of the frequency 
of the training and whether employees were randomly tested to see if they had retained what 
they had been taught. 
Another concern in the survey was that organizations are becoming somewhat less 
actively involved in sharing.  The number of respondents who are not members of an 
information sharing organization has grown over the past two years.  For example, membership 
in InfraGard dropped by 6 percent.   InfraGard is an information sharing and analysis effort 
serving the interests and combining the knowledge base of a wide range of members.  ISAC 
(Information Sharing and Analysis Center) groups also saw a dip in membership (Richardson, 
2008).  There is no clear surge in growth of membership in such groups.  As in previous years, 
only about 25% of respondents say they have contacted a law enforcement agency about 
security breaches. 
Not realizing the core importance of information security awareness among users will 
lead to security issues in many organizations because no proper awareness programs exist.  
Also, users are unaware of the risks of using the company’s IT infrastructure, and the potential 
damage that the users can cause.  Users that are properly made aware of the risks and 
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potential damage that can take place are more likely to take security more seriously.  
Furthermore they are often not even aware of the information security policies, procedures, 
and standards existing in the organization.  Users cannot be held responsible for security 
problems if they are not told what such security problems are and what they should do to 
prevent them (Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004). 
Ways to Avoid Data Compromises (Breaches) 
 
There are many ways to avoid breaches or computer security incidences.  McGlasson 
found that it was important that third party handlers of data is as secure as the company that is 
providing the actual data, and that it is critical to make sure that data is appropriately 
encrypted when it leaves the organization (McGlasson, 2008).  It is also important to make sure 
that systems are compliant with any local and federal regulations and laws, and if the 
organization is hacked, to promptly notify partners and law enforcement agencies of the attack.  
Areas of protection must exist at both the local and global levels (Cuppens, 2005).  The local 
level would include threats to information located on a single system.  At this level, regular 
audits and backups are necessary to maintain data integrity.  At the global level, it is necessary 
to create a security policy to control global threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the data which arise from ill-considered aggregation of systems and other causes 
(Anderson, 1996). 
Specifically, systems administrators and managers need to begin with an understanding 
of the threats that their systems face, and then they must study the vulnerabilities that are 
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inherent to the identified threats.  Mitigation efforts should be focused in a number of areas, 
starting with the users and their awareness of what they should do to protect the information 
resources of the organization.  Next, it is important to ensure that essential controls are met. 
Following through on security policies so that they are actually implemented and ensuring that 
a basic set of controls is consistently met across the organization is also necessary.  
Organizations must find, track, and assess data.  They need to know where data is located and 
the category of data (i.e., not sensitive, sensitive, secret, etc.).  Based on the hundreds of 
breaches investigated, efforts to locate, catalogue, track, and address the risks of data stored in 
and flowing through information assets are highly beneficial in reducing the likelihood of data 
compromise (Baker, 2008).  Organizations should strategically identify what systems should be 
monitored and what events are alertable (Baker, 2008).  Steps should then be taken to ensure 
alerts are noticed and acted upon when they do happen.   
The goal of an organization should be to implement security measures so that it costs 
the illicit hacker more to compromise the system than other available targets.  Softer or easier 
targets are still in ample supply.  In 82% of cases, victims possessed the ability to discover the 
breach had they been more diligent in monitoring and analyzing event-related information 
available to them at the time of the incident.  In V-CoPs, members must be alert and carefully 
assuring that confidential and proprietary data and information is not carelessly posted or sent 
to insecure and unknown sources.  Overall, the breakdown is in the process.  Organizations 
seem to lack a fully proceduralized routine for collecting, analyzing, and reporting on log activity 
outside of the norm (Baker, 2008).  Furthermore, 87% of breaches could have been avoided if 
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reasonable security controls had been in place at the time of the incident (Baker, 2008).  The 
following recommendations provide a starting point (Baker, 2008): 
 Align process with policy – 59% of victims knew what to do, and intended to do it, 
but did not follow through.  Controls focused on accountability and ensuring that 
policies are carried out can be extremely effective in mitigating the risk of data 
compromise. 
 
 Achieve essential then worry about excellent – 83% of breaches were caused by 
attacks not considered to be highly difficult and 85% were opportunistic.  Hackers 
prefer to exploit weaknesses rather than strengths (if they do not find an easy target 
at a particular organization, they will move on to easier targets).  A V-CoP that is 
unsecure will be an easy target for hackers.  Organizations need to identify a set of 
essential controls and ensure their implementation across the organization and then 
move on to more advanced controls. 
 
 Create a data retention plan – 66% of breaches involved data that the victim did not 
know was on the system.  Organizations should identify and quantify the types of 
data retained during business activities and then work to categorize data based on 
risk and liability (i.e., what data cannot suffer compromise and prioritize 
accordingly).   V-CoPs must make sure that the data shared and stored in the data 
repository is deleted when no longer needed or used, especially when this data is 
confidential in nature.  Backups of data must also occur within the V-CoP so that if 
an attack or system malfunction occurs the data can be readily and easily restored to 
a correct state.   
 
 Monitor event logs – evidence of events leading up to 82% of data breaches was 
available to the organization prior to actual compromise, but information regarding 
the attack was neither noticed nor acted upon.  The end-user is not going to be held 
responsible for reading the logs since they should not have access, but a procedure 
must be in place for a V-CoP where the log data is part of the normal review process 
of the organization. 
 
 Create an incident response plan – the victim organization must be ready to 
respond.  When a member of a V-CoP detects or suspects an incident they must 
know the proper procedure for reporting the incident.   
 
 Increase awareness – implementing a required awareness program is the key focus 
of the proposal to increase awareness through education and training.  Users that 
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are made aware of the potential threats to a system and the ramifications of these 
threats should be better stewards of their V-CoPs realms. 
 
 Engage in mock incident testing - organizations should undergo routine training in 
the area of incident response.  Attendance should be required as mandatory by 
policy and is key to the proposal to test if the member of a V-CoP has increased their 
awareness and ability to properly respond to security threats and attacks. 
 
 
There are three basic controls for implementing security in any environment – from 
internal systems to external virtual environment systems (Lampson, 2004): 
 Authenticating principals – determines who made a request (person, program, or 
group).  In a virtual environment this is particularly difficult since authentication 
is based on the assumption that the person on the other end of the 
communication is who they claim to be based on their electronic credentials. 
 
 Authorizing access – determines who is trusted to do what to an object (read, 
write, copy, delete, etc.).  V-CoPs must have a clear policy that monitors and 
specifies access control based on need and requirement.  The rule of thumb is to 
grant the member (end-user) the minimum rights needed to effectively 
participate in the community. 
 
 Auditing the guard’s decisions – used to determine what happened and why did 
the guard let a certain principal perform a task on an object.  Follow up on access 
and why certain members were permitted access to certain data (objects) on the 
practice site.  Ownership and control plays an important role.  The owner of the 
data should be responsible for controlling who has access to the data, can 
modify the content, can delete the file, and can change permissions. 
It is important that knowledge providers should not give up their autonomy to prohibit 
access to users they do not trust, even when they satisfy the security rules of the virtual 
community.  The policy rules for managing knowledge in a secure way concern not only which 
knowledge the users are prohibited or permitted to access, but also which regulations the 
community members are allowed or obliged to enforce (Boella and van der Torre, 2006). 
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Threats to Confidentiality 
 
According to Anderson (1996), threats were common from insider abuse and were 
compounded by the aggregation of data within organizations.  As more and more organizations 
collect and store more data, there are more targets available to would-be hackers or 
opportunists who would take advantage of inadequately secured data repositories, especially in 
a V-CoP.  Self-organizing systems can be more difficult to protect as the membership can be 
varied and constantly changing.  The more valuable the data, the higher the likelihood of 
compromise as worthless data does not need to be as closely guarded.  The fragmentation of 
much of the data within an organization leads to other issues as this data is most likely not 
properly protected. In the medical world, for example, a banker had access to his clients’ 
medical records and called in loans of those with health issues.  Abuses, misuse, or mishandling 
of information is common in most fields.  The real political struggle is over control, such as who 
controls the data and the data’s flow within the organization.   
Someone must be held responsible for every piece of data collected and stored within 
an organization’s network.  Determining how ownership is to be managed is a key aspect of the 
security policy as ultimately the owner will be held responsible for the protection of this data 
(or at least needs to be aware of where it is stored and who has access). 
Providing Access 
 
Access control lists (ACL) are lists of what users and programs can access the system or 
data, and what type of access they have.  One way to look at access in the context of the 
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security policy is that records, depending upon their level of security, will be marked with an 
ACL and people or processes that are not on the list will be denied access to the information in 
any form (Anderson, 1996).  These lists must be consistent across all systems in the 
organization so that holes are not created by competing lists or inheritance from a global to a 
local list.  Access can range from none, to read only, to modify, to create and delete.  As with 
ownership of the actual data, someone or some department must be responsible for 
maintaining who has the ability to change or modify the ACL for the specified data.  In a highly 
confidential environment, access may not be granted to the IT administrator if he should not 
have access to view or change the data (Anderson, 1996).  Strong notification requirements are 
needed to help control fraud and other misuses of data, particularly highly sensitive and 
valuable data (Anderson, 1996). 
Another consideration that organizations need to be aware of is persistence or the 
length of time that data must be kept.  As mentioned earlier, a well-defined retention policy 
must be created and enforced for systems and virtual communities.  There are local, state, and 
federal laws on the length of time that specific types of data must be kept by various 
organizations and businesses (such as banks, hospitals, etc.).  Information that is currently in 
the system should be updated through appending new data rather than deleting recent 
versions, and data should only be deleted for records that have expired or are found to be 
corrupt (Merali and Davies, 2001).  A record should also be kept of who accessed information 
and what they did to that information.  Did they just view the information or did they append 
or modify the information?  A change log must be kept to ensure proper attribution of access. 
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Information Security Policies 
 
An InfoSec policy contains rules and regulations that are laid out in written form that 
clearly defines how an organization is going to protect its valuable information resources.  
InfoSec policies include acceptable use of computer systems and data, rules and regulations for 
accessing data, and other topics related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information resources.  According to Bishop, “A security policy, a specific statement of what is 
and is not allowed, defines the system’s security.  If the system always stays in states that are 
allowed, and users can only perform actions that are allowed, the system is secure. If the 
system can enter a disallowed state, or if a user can successfully execute a disallowed action, 
the system is non-secure” (Bishop, 2003).  In a V-CoP the security policy must be as vigorously 
enforced as in any other environment.  The key issue is when members are from organizations 
with different policies, so the members or creators of the V-CoP must come up with a common 
or global policy that all members can agree upon.  Creating the global policy may be as simple 
as finding the common elements from all of the member organizations’ policies and enforcing 
these common rules and regulations. 
The SANS Institute defines a security policy as “a document that outlines specific 
requirements or rules that must be met.  In the information/network security realm, policies 
are usually point-specific, covering a single area.  For example, an "Acceptable Use" policy 
would cover the rules and regulations for appropriate use of the computing facilities” 
(SANS.ORG, 2008).  The primary purpose of the security policy is to regulate access to data, 
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maintain proper controls over the information that is stored on an organization’s computer 
system, and to mandate the proper use of the computer resources available to the user 
(Anderson, 1996; Bishop, 2003; Cuppens, 2006).  Lastly, according to Cholvy and Belin, “the 
primary goal of a security policy is to specify [the] means for facing a given environment of 
threats” or as a specific case of regulation (Cholvy and Belin, 1997).   
Without an information security policy, there would be no apparent requirement for 
secure practices, and security would be either ignored or implemented in an ad hoc manner, 
and thus, control could be either too rigid or completely missing (Boella, and van der Torre, 
2006).  An information security plan must be based on identified risks.  It is therefore essential 
that a company must base its information security plan on some type of risk analysis exercise 
(Cuppens, 1996; Von Solms, and Von Solms, 2004).   
Security policies in a distributed environment provide a greater challenge, particularly 
when the policy applies to multiple organizations or organizations and groups from other 
companies.  Controlling the quality of information that is shared within a V-CoP is critical to its 
success (Neus, 2001).  Key to a security policy: is the control of data: who is responsible and 
who ultimately owns the data.  There is local knowledge and global knowledge.  The local 
knowledge should be handled and controlled by the local department or organization that is 
part of the V-CoP.  The global knowledge is that knowledge which is available to all members of 
the community and is distinguished from knowledge that is in the public domain.  In this model 
of local and global control, information or document providers retain the control of their 
documents and they specify in local policies the conditions of use of their documents which 
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means that they can determine what types of access are permitted to various documents per 
user or per group.  If information owners are not clearly defined and held responsible for the 
security of the information under their control, severe risks do arise. Accountability for 
information security must be shared by all employees, and not only the information security 
manager (von Solms and von Solms, 2004).  
The knowledge providers prefer not to give up their own power to enforce local policies 
for the access to the documents they control.  There are cases where security administrators 
are not fully trustworthy, for example, when multinational virtual communities are headed by 
foreign countries with varying security standards (Boella and van der Torre, 2006).  So, leaving 
autonomy to the knowledge providers must be balanced with the requirement that their local 
access policies should be organized according to a global policy defining how the knowledge 
should be shared among participants.  As van Elst et al. (2004) observe organizations, 
departments, groups and individual experts develop their particular views on a given subject.  
In V-CoPs, global access controls cannot be directly implemented, since no one owns all of the 
documents or information in the system.  Global policies are issued and enforced by a 
community authorization service (CAS): A given group or community runs a CAS server to track 
its membership and contains fine-grained access-control policies. A user wishing to access 
community resources contacts the CAS server, which delegates rights to the user based on the 
request and the user’s role (i.e., what access they have to which documents or other 
information) within the community.  A key problem associated with the formation and 
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operation of distributed virtual communities is that of how to specify and enforce these 
community policies (Pearlman et al., 2002).   
One example of this global and local policy hierarchy is the interconnection of electronic 
health record (EHR) systems (Gritzalis and Lambrinoudakis, 2004).  EHR systems facilitate the 
collaboration of independent health care units (HCU), with each unit remaining sovereign in its 
own domain and defining its own security policy (similar to a local security policy).  However, 
users in one domain may ask to access information in any other domain (i.e., global policy).  The 
network of interconnected sites is not static.  A new HCU may join the network at any time.  
There is no central authority administrating or even enforcing a common policy to all 
interconnected sites.  The fact that medical information can be accessed from some unknown 
remote location, possibly belonging to a different domain and thus exhibiting a different 
security policy, imposes the need to treat the data in accordance to specific security attributes 
(policies) attached to it.  No predefined trust relations among individual HCUs or groups of units 
can be assumed.  Trust evaluations should be dynamic.  The security requirements that have 
been identified include:  Each HCU should have the freedom to design its own security policy 
and to enforce it within its domain. Through the interconnection of different domains, a 
multiple-security-policies environment will emerge.  Consequently, several policy conflicts may 
occur, posing the need for a ‘resolving’ mechanism.   Static and rigid security policies, based on 
the currently dominant ‘‘subject—to—object’’ paradigm are not suitable. The requirement is 
for policies that are context-aware and adaptable.   The integrity and confidentiality of medical 
information should be ensured.   Medical records, when communicated to remote health care 
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units (different domains) should be protected through their own access control policy.   Users 
should be authenticated in their local EHR systems (local domain). When they request 
authorization to access resources in some remote system they should not be asked to re-submit 
their credentials or to provide any additional credentials (Gritzalis and Lambrinoudakis, 2004). 
At the global level, users should adhere to an agreed upon or standard policy that can 
be applied to all users of the V-CoP (or community) and that do not violate the local policies 
implemented by the local owners of the system.  An agreed upon policy for the community 
needs to be defined that does not violate the local policies from each member’s organization 
from the V-CoP.  For example, at the global level, participants should not communicate their 
passwords or distribute copyrighted files by means of the community. If they violate these basic 
global policies, they are banned from the community, since the membership to the system is 
under the control of the global authority.  There are policies that apply to other policies, such as 
global policies that constrain or permit local policies (Sloman, 1994).  The global authority could 
oblige local ones to forbid access, permit-to-permit access, or permit-to-forbid access.   
However, it is not sufficient that the global obligation to permit or oblige access is satisfied by 
the fact that the local provider issues permission or an obligation. Norms are ineffective if they 
are not enforced by the system who issued them: violations of norms should be recognized as 
such and sanctioned according to the standards set in the policy (Boella and van der Torre, 
2006). 
Configuring the network security policies globally and locally remains a “complex and 
error-prone task due to rule dependency semantics and the interaction between policies in the 
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network” (Hamed and Al-Shaer, 2006), but will depend upon the type of V-CoP.  Security policy 
complexity is likely to increase as the size of the network increases. A successful deployment of 
a network security system requires global analysis of policy configurations of all network 
security devices in order to avoid policy conflicts and inconsistency.  Increasing threats of 
network attacks against security devices requires careful configuration.  Firewalls and IPSec 
(internet protocol security) gateways have become important integrated elements not only in 
enterprise networks but also in small and home networks.  Deploying these tools provides for 
incredible flexibility for customizing the proper protection for different networks and 
applications.  But, even expert administrators can make serious mistakes when configuring the 
security policy of these devices.  Administrators must be aware of policy conflict types and the 
lack of automated verification of security policies (Hamed and Al-Shaer, 2006).    In a V-CoP, 
policy configuration is particularly problematic where there is likely to be both local and global 
policy rules.  If these rules conflict or overlap, they may open a hole in the security of the 
community and provide easy access to sensitive documents and other non-public information.  
A V-CoP policy would include many of the same policies found in a traditional security policy.  
However, when multiple organizations are represented by the V-CoP the primary members 
must agree upon what global policies are to be followed by all members of the community and 
which policies may be specific to an organization.  These policy conflicts occur due to rule 
misconfiguration within a single policy or between policies in different devices (Hamed and Al-
Shaer, 2006).     ACLs control who has access, what they have access to, and what level or type 
of access they have to the information.   
46 
 
When conflicts occur, they usually exist between rules in the same security device 
(intrapolicy conflicts) or in different devices (interpolicy conflicts).  Intrapolicy conflicts occur 
when different rule orderings may imply different and incorrect policy semantics.  Some rules 
may be concealed by other rules, resulting in an incorrect policy.  Interpolicy conflicts could 
exist between policies of different devices. For example, a firewall might block traffic that is 
permitted by another downstream firewall, or an upstream IPSec device might protect traffic 
that is not protected by the peer downstream device (Hamed and Al-Shaer, 2006).  Once again, 
human error is the critical factor in these security policy conflicts and can lead to severe 
consequences if not properly managed. 
 
Simulation and Training in Computer Security 
 
Simulation and training have long been used to train people for a wide variety of tasks.  
The most well known is the flight simulator whose origins go back to 1910 when the Sanders 
Teacher was introduced (Rolfe and Staples, 1988).  Since that time, simulation has grown in 
scope and is being used in almost every field from medicine to traffic control.   
Medicine has seen tremendous advances through the use of simulation.  A major 
benefit is that doctors can practice procedures and diagnostics in a simulated environment 
without any human cost (Friedrich, 2002).  For example, educators at Penn State University 
have created a program for anesthesia residents called “The First Three Days of Anesthesia” 
where they are introduced to the various tasks involved in delivering anesthesia to a patient.  
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At the end of the three days, they are then given the opportunity to deliver anesthesia to a 
simulator (Friedrich, 2002).  Errors in a simulated environment do not result in human trauma 
or fatalities, nor do they result in financial loss due to user error.   
Simulation is also used in education and to train students on such things as business, 
information technology, chemistry, biology, physics, math, and even the social sciences.  Many 
colleges and universities offer virtual labs to their students to perform experiments, run tests, 
check solutions, and more.    
Simulation has also been utilized in computer security.  One example is the Center for 
the Information Systems Studies and Research (CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate School where a 
broad program in computer security education has been established (Irvine, 2004).  Part of this 
effort has been the creation of CyberCIEGE, a computer simulation game that teaches 
computer security principles.  Players of the game construct computer networks and make 
choices impacting the game’s virtual users’ ability to protect valuable assets.  The game 
includes a language that enables the user to express different security scenarios and a variety 
of different security policies (Irvine, 2004).  The CyberCIEGE tool can be used to train security 
administrators on simple tasks such as password length, opening emails with unknown 
attachments, identification of other users, and more.   
Another computer security training tool called RINSE (Real-Time Immersive Network 
Simulation Environment) is a simulator being built to support large-scale network security 
preparedness and training exercises (Liljenstam et. al., 2006).  The goal of RINSE is to create a 
realistic environment where the simulated network behaves as if a real attack were taking 
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place.  The system will support hundreds of players and a modeled network composed of 
hundreds of local area networks (LANs).  Players will diagnose events and try to counter the 
attacks through the RINSE interface.   
 
Taxonomy of Computer Security Incidents 
 
Computer security incidents can be categorized based on a number of possible facets, 
including type of breach, level of potential harm and risk to the organization, level of expertise 
needed to perpetrate the incident, type of organizational structure (such as a V-CoP), and ease 
of detection by automated and human measures.  Categories have been developed by a 
number of researchers in the cyber security field (Kjaerland, 2006).  Each of these researchers 
looked at computer security incidents from a slightly different perspective.  For example, one 
looked at the incidents based on the activities that the hacker was involved in, and another 
divided hackers into a spectrum of abilities.  However, the most comprehensive collection of 
computer security incidents has been collected by CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response 
Team/Coordination Center) at Carnegie Mellon University.  CERT/CC collected 319,992 reported 
incidents from 1988-2003 (CERT/CC, 2004).  Based on these incidents and focus on the com and 
gov domains, Kjaerland has come up with a new taxonomy (Kjaerland, 2006).  It is worth noting 
that the majority of V-CoPs fall within these 2 domains and are therefore susceptible to the 
wiles of the hacker community. 
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Table 1 shows this new taxonomy that has been broken down into four facets: source 
sectors, method of operation (MO), impact, and target sectors.  Source sectors refers to the 
source of the incident, or the sectors that attackers came from when attempting to attack a 
system.  MO refers to the tool used to attempt the attack.  Impact refers to the effect of the 
attack or what the attacker was trying to accomplish.  Lastly, target sector refers to the victim 
of the incident or, in this case, the domain they can be found under.  The majority of the attacks 
were aimed at com and gov target sectors. 
Table 1 - A New Taxonomy (Kjaerland, 2006) 
A new taxonomy (Kjaerland, 2006) 
Source sectors Method of operation (MO) Impact Target sectors 
Com 
Gov 
Edu 
Intl 
User 
Unknown 
Misuse of Resources 
User Compromise 
Root Compromise 
Social Engineering 
Virus 
Web Compromise 
Trojan 
Worm 
Recon 
Denial of Service 
Disrupt 
Distort 
Destruct 
Disclosure 
Unknown 
Com 
Gov 
 
Kjaerland (2006) found by analyzing the reported incidences that the most common 
type of incidence was root compromise, where the hacker gained access to the root of the 
system being attacked.  Root attacks were the most common attack in both the com and gov 
target sectors.  The com sectors reported root compromise for 35% of the incidences, with the 
next closest compromise being virus attacks at 26.5%.  The gov sectors reported root 
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compromise for 25% of the incidences, with the next closest being web compromise at 22.5%, 
followed by reconnaissance (probing systems for weaknesses) at 14.8% and finally virus attacks 
at 13.8%.  The most common type of incidence was root compromise followed by virus 
infections and or attempted attacks (Kjaerland, 2006; CERT/CC, 2004).   
Root compromise is the most dangerous type of hack since the intruder has 
administrative access to the system being attacked. However, root attacks cannot be corrected 
by an end-user or a member of a V-CoP.  For the purpose of this research, root compromise can 
be ruled out as a V-CoP member issue.  The next most common type of incidence was virus 
attacks for com target sectors and fourth for gov sectors.  The incidence types for gov after root 
compromise would also not be a V-CoP member issue but rather the responsibility of the 
system administrator.  Members of a V-CoP would be more likely to encounter virus or phishing 
attacks which are targeted at the end-user.  Phishing attacks take advantage of users’ inability 
to discriminate between bogus and genuine web sites and the web sites’ content (Kumaranguru 
et. al., 2007).  In a V-CoP environment this may become an issue as members share documents 
that may become infected by a virus or if an attacker is able to gain access to the password 
protected section of the V-CoP the hacker may be able to cause damage, though not an end-
user issue.    
The primary focus then needs to be on the member or end-user of a V-CoP and what 
likely incidents may occur and how simulation and training can be used to help curtail computer 
security incidents.  Computer viruses seem to be of primary concern since they are most 
common and easier to encounter in everyday email exchanges and when infected documents 
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are shared in a V-CoP.   According to Dickinson (2005), “The often long delay between the time 
a virus attack is launched and its signature is distributed, results in hundreds of thousands of 
infected messages delivered to enterprise networks and communities of ISP users, prior to the 
availability of any protection from its deployment”.  Even though users alone cannot be blamed 
for innocently opening email attachments, they can be made aware of the potential threats and 
problems caused by viruses.  If viruses are not detected and the user opens an email 
attachment, the outcome is that the infected messages will almost certainly result in hundreds 
of infected PCs.  That translates into tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in desktop 
clean up costs for each virus outbreak at each corporation, and untold costs to consumers.  An 
estimated rate of 900 million virally infected messages a day, from four to five serious virus 
attacks per month, makes that cost unacceptable. As a result, many companies and vendors are 
exploring preventive systems that can stop virus outbreaks before they happen and minimize 
any damage or cost (Dickinson, 2005). 
 
Summary 
 
The practicality of computer security depends upon a number of factors.  However, 
user-error is the major cause of security breaches and incidents (Kjaerland, 2006).  An 
organization must have a strong computer security policy that is enforceable and not cost 
prohibitive.  If it is not reasonable or cost effective to implement a policy then it is useless, or at 
least the components that meet this specification are not of use (Schneider, 2000).  What is 
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central to any security policy is the adherence to the policy by the end-user.  Do they know 
enough about the policy and do they understand the risks of not adhering to the policy?  A solid 
understanding of both the risks and rewards of proper adherence to the policy is essential to 
keeping information as secure as possible.    Awareness and training are crucial to ensuring a 
safe and effective V-CoP.     
Members of any virtual community, particularly a V-CoP, need to understand the 
security issues involved in modern day computer security.  This includes the importance of 
proper password creation and retention, virus protection, proper identification of members of 
the community, and other parts of the information security policy.  To this end, members of a 
V-CoP must be properly trained and tested to ensure that they not only understand the major 
security issues of any electronic system, but that they follow these policies.  Von Solms 
acknowledged that users cannot be held responsible for security problems if they are not told 
what such security problems are, and what they should do to prevent them (Von Solms and 
Von Solms, 2004).   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
In V-CoPs, security is essential to ensure that proprietary and secret data is kept secure, 
and that computer infections do not enter the group and cause damage to the data that is part 
of the knowledge base or worse.  Chapter 2 provided background information on the current 
issues with computer security and how viruses are the major end-user problem.  What is 
needed is a model of training that uses training with simulation and follow-up testing to 
monitor members of a V-CoP to see if they are remaining vigilant toward risks and 
understanding and following the tenants of a traditional security policy of an organization and 
of a V-CoP.  Deterrence theory was used as the underlying theory for educating users of 
potential security risks and threats.  Deterrence theory will produce a greater level of 
awareness to these security risks and threats if the end user understands the risks and costs.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, deterrence theory is based on the premise that computer hacks will 
be less likely to occur if there is the assumption by the hacker that they have a high probability 
of being caught, and that the punishment will be swift.  Deterrence theory was applied in this 
research to show the user of technology, specifically users in a V-CoP, that lax security 
adherence can lead to severe repercussions for the users’ organization.  If users are made 
aware of the damage that can be done by not following proper security protocols, they should 
be deterred from not following them.   
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Furthermore, proper security awareness training, using simulated scenarios, may help 
to deter users from the mishandling of data and inadequate understanding and adherence to 
their organization’s security policy and, if different, the security policy of their V-CoP.  
Additional benefits of this research include the demonstration of how to use simulation for 
training purposes in a V-CoP, and how simulation can be used to do follow-up training and 
testing in a V-CoP. 
Computer security breaches and incidents are prolific and the primary causes are end-
user carelessness and mistakes (Baker, 2008).  In a V-CoP, the need to understand and learn 
proper security procedures is particularly necessary as the members may never interact 
personally and need to know if the people on the other end of electronic communications are 
who they say that they are and that they should have access to the data (Hakala, 2008).  
Furthermore, the members must also apply standard security policy procedures to all of their 
electronic interactions. 
The purpose of the study was to see the difference between the results of initial training 
with simulated security scenarios and on-going security awareness training with simulated 
security scenarios with an experimental group and three control groups, with only two of the 
groups receiving the initial training with simulated scenarios on the security issues related to 
the policy and procedures of a V-CoP. 
The rest of this chapter will cover the research study and details of the subjects that 
were used in this study.   
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Research Study 
 
A unique opportunity existed at UCF Regional Campuses to conduct research using an 
existing V-CoP.  UCF Regional Campuses currently works with faculty from seven different post-
secondary institutions on curriculum alignment issues through a professional V-CoP site that 
enables members to upload files, share and comment on ideas, provide best practices, and hold 
discussions.  The site, http://www.curriculumalignment.ucf.edu, is powered by the Confluence 
wiki system.  The groups worked well for the research since they are divided into separate 
subject matter areas.  The subject matter groups are a network organization since they are 
independent organizations that work on projects and processes (Powell, 1990).  The groups 
meet physically on a semi-annual basis but the majority of the pre- and post-work is electronic 
communication through the web portal that contains both public and password protected 
sections for each subject matter area.  The subject matter areas in the V-CoP are biology, 
chemistry, math, and physics.  The groups consisted of faculty from the seven institutions that 
are involved in curriculum alignment and best practices within their subject matter area.  Prior 
to recruitment of the subjects, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was required by the 
university to use human subjects in research.  Appendix H contains the approval letter from the 
IRB to conduct this research. 
Upon IRB approval, subjects were recruited and then randomly selected to the 
treatment group or one of the control groups so that there were similar numbers of users in 
each group.  The random selection and placement of subjects from different disciplines into 
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groups labeled A, B, C and D for the experiment also helped to minimize potentially skewed 
results based on field of expertise.  The pre-training test at the beginning of the research helped 
to assess the users’ existing knowledge about information security and the components of a 
standard security policy.       
The four groups answered some basic demographic questions prior to the beginning of 
the study (see Appendix A).  Table 2 shows the schedule of the study.  After the table, there is a 
detailed explanation of the events.  
 Table 2 - Timeline and Events for Research Study 
 
Time Frame Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Start Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Start Pre-training test Pre-training test Pre-training test  
1-2 weeks Security Awareness 
Training with 
Simulated Scenarios 
and Post-training 
test 
Post-training test Security Awareness 
Training with 
Simulated Scenarios 
and Post-training 
test 
 
3 weeks Security Training 
with Simulated 
Scenarios and 
Follow-up Testing 
Security Training 
with Simulated 
Scenarios and 
Follow-up Testing 
  
6 weeks Same as above Same as above   
9 weeks Same as above Same as above   
10 weeks Final Test Final Test Final Test Final Test 
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Groups A, B, and C took an information security pre-training test to assess their existing 
knowledge and to be used as a baseline for future testing (see Appendix B).  
Approximately 1-2 weeks after the pre-training test, Group A and Group C received 
awareness training on computer security issues with simulated security scenarios along with 
the potential impacts of improper security procedures.  A web-based interactive training 
session on computer security, with simulated security scenarios, that follows the tenets of a 
standard security policy was delivered to Group A and Group C in an online web-based format 
(using a registered domain name www.tidnet.com/infosectraining).    Each section of the 
tutorial presented proper computer security procedures with simulated security scenarios, 
followed by examples of potential risks and how these risks can ultimately impact the 
organization.  The tutorial started out with an overview of information security in general and 
its importance, including examples of organizations that have been breached and the results of 
these breaches.  Historical examples of failing to follow proper security protocols were used to 
educate and provide information to deter lax execution of security procedures.  When users are 
made aware of the high costs and potential damage and harm that can be inflicted with such 
breaches, deterrence theory posits that they should be discouraged from making careless 
mistakes when securing their data.   
The web-based training provided overall training on the security issues.  It included 
proper virus protection and prevention, proper password creation and maintenance, document 
and information protection, social engineering prevention methods, physical control of 
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personal resources, proper internet usage, phishing, and other related information security 
issues.   
After the training session with simulated security scenarios (tutorial) for Groups A and C, 
they were presented with 20 security questions which asked the subjects to respond to each 
question presented with what they thought was the most secure answer.   Each alternative was 
ranked from 1 to 5; 1 being the least secure response, and 5 being the most secure response.   
However, the answers were randomized so that the test subjects were not able to follow a 
pattern if similar questions were encountered.  Post-training test results were compared to the 
pre-training test results.  The questions were different but assessed the same subject matter 
and objectives.  Also, embedded in the training were simulated scenarios of emails that, if 
opened, popped up a warning message.  At the end of the test, the end-users were notified of 
the next steps and thanked for their participation in the particular completed section.   
At 3, 6, and 9 weeks, following the initial security awareness training with simulated 
security scenarios and the post-training test, Group A and Group B were presented with more 
computer security training with a simulated event and were tested to measure the 
effectiveness of the training.  The control group responses were compared to those of the 
treatment group and to the previous control group test scores.  The tests for each training 
session were different and included a simulated security event, such as a bogus email with an 
attachment, which when opened, popped-up a warning that the user would have been infected 
with a virus.  These were embedded within the training so that firewalls and other security 
software did not flag or route the emails to the junk or spam mail folder. 
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Other simulated security scenarios included phishing attempts and social engineering 
attempts.  An example of a phishing event was to try to get the members of either Group A or B 
to respond to an email that was asking for proprietary information.  An example social 
engineering event was a simulated phone call to the subjects from someone pretending to be 
from the IT Department who asked for information that should not be revealed, such as a 
password or other sensitive information.  Social engineering events were also embedded within 
the tutorial simulations. 
An additional example was a simulated email environment where the user is asked to 
respond to an email coming from someone inside of their organization.  If the user clicked on 
the attachment to the email, the file produced an error message that alerted the user to a virus 
infection.  They were then asked to further respond to the scenario by providing information on 
how they would report the security breach using an ordinal scale put in the form of a multiple 
choice question (5 = most  secure, 1 = least secure).  Another simulated scenario was a request 
from an “apparent” member of the V-CoP who needed a secure document.  The end-user 
would then have responded to the request by providing the document.  The training and 
subsequent periodic testing was composed of other simulated scenarios like those mentioned 
above.  Each simulated scenario was followed up by a series of questions that asked the 
subjects to determine the most secure response.  The follow-up questions and the possible 
responses may be seen in Appendix B. 
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The topics presented in the initial training were based on the SANS Institutes security 
policy project (SANS.org, 2009).  The initial training was estimated to last approximately 30-45 
minutes.  The timing was verified during the pilot-test and the test subjects responded that the 
time did fall between 30 and 45 minutes.  Each topic covered in the tutorial consisted of a 
definition of the topic followed by the proper application of the definition.  For example, a 
section on passwords included the proper definition of a strong password followed by examples 
of strong and weak passwords and some details on how hackers can easily crack passwords 
with readily available software.  Table 3 lists the topics covered, the sub-topics, and the 
outcomes that were measured. 
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Table 3 - Topics to be Included in the Computer Security Tutorial 
Topic Sub-Topics Outcomes to be Measured 
Passwords 1.   Proper length 
2.   Composition of characters 
3.   Changing password 
4.   Definition of a strong 
password 
5.   Associated risks 
1. Understanding of the importance 
of a strong password 
2. Defining how often a password 
should be changed 
3. Describe the potential risks 
associated with weak passwords 
File sharing and 
management 
1. Types of documents. 
2. Proprietary nature of 
document 
3. Version management 
4. Backups 
5. Deleted and stolen 
documents 
6. Legal issues 
7. Ownership and control of 
data 
1. Clear understanding of what 
documents should be shared and 
to whom 
2. List the risks associated with 
sharing documents to 
unauthorized users 
3. Define the potential penalties 
associated with sharing 
proprietary and confidential 
documents 
4. Understand the responsibility and 
liability of the owner of the 
compromised data 
Email Use 1. Email security issues 
2. Ownership of emails 
3. Opening attachments 
4. Proper identification of 
sender 
1. Understand the risks associated 
with emails 
2. Define the risks associated with 
opening attachments 
3. List the proper way of identifying 
the sender of an email message 
4. Financial impacts of improper 
email security 
Virus 
prevention 
1. Types of viruses 
2. Anti-virus software 
3. Anti-virus definitions 
4. Infected files 
5. Preventing infection 
6. Scanning files  
7. Examples of damages 
caused by viruses 
1. Understand the risks associated 
with out-of-date anti-virus 
software. 
2. Know basic techniques to prevent 
virus infection 
3. Identify suspicious web links in 
emails or on other web sites 
4. Understand to do when a file or 
system is infected 
5. Explain the potential financial and 
other damage causes by viruses 
62 
 
Table 3 - Topics to be Included in the Computer Security Tutorial (cont’d) 
Phishing 
protection 
1. Definition of phishing 
2. Phishing techniques 
3. Potential risks 
4. Examples of phishing 
attempts and their results 
1. Define phishing and how it is used 
to compromise end-user security 
2. Understand the risks associated 
with phishing 
Data and data 
storage device 
disposal 
1. Importance of proper data 
disposal 
2. Risks associated with 
improper data disposal 
3. Deleting data from and 
destroying data storage 
devices 
4. When to dispose of out-of-
date data. 
1. Understand the importance of 
proper data disposal 
2.  Identify risks that are associated 
with the improper disposal of data 
and data storage devices 
3. List the proper techniques for 
deleting data from storage devices 
4. Define when data should be 
disposed of and the legal issues 
surrounding data deletion 
Social 
engineering 
1. Definition 
2. Types  
3. Ways it is used 
4. Risks and examples  
5. Ways to protect against  
1. Recognize the proper definition of 
social engineering 
2. List several types of social 
engineering 
3. Understand the risks associated 
4. List ways to protect against 
5. Describe several different 
applications of social engineering 
Work space 
security 
1. Proper security of data 
devices and systems 
2. Security issues of the 
physical  work space 
3. Storage 
4. Security of occupied and 
non-occupied work spaces 
1. Understand the importance of 
proper work space security 
2. List several different ways to 
secure the work space 
3. Describe proper ways to store 
data 
4. Define the difference strategies 
for securing an occupied and 
unoccupied work space 
Mobile device 
security 
1. Securing laptops and other 
mobile devices 
2. Password protection 
3. Physical security issues 
4. Data backup 
5. Risks associated with 
compromised devices 
1. Understand the importance of 
mobile device security 
2. Describe why password protection 
is important 
3. List physical security concerns for 
mobile devices 
4. Define the steps taken when a 
device is stolen or compromised 
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At the end of the research period, and at each training and testing interval, the test 
answer data was analyzed and contrasted using the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric ranked 
multi-group statistical test.   It was assumed that the Group A had a more effective response 
rate to the testing and simulated security scenarios.  The four groups were used to determine 
the effect that testing had on the control group with or without intermittent testing and 
training with simulated security scenarios.   
The next section lists the research questions and hypotheses for this research study.  
After each time period, test data was collected and analyzed to determine if the null 
hypothesis, no significant difference, was rejected.  If the null hypothesis was rejected, then we 
know that the training, with simulated security scenarios, did impact the security awareness of 
the treatment group. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 
 The focus of the research was on the impact that security awareness training 
using simulated security training and testing has on members of V-CoPs.  Below are questions 
and hypotheses that relate to the training with simulated scenarios and testing that took place 
during the proposed research.   
Initial training question  
Will users who receive the security awareness training with simulated security 
scenarios show a positive significant difference in how they respond to the post-
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training test on computer security in comparison to the users who received no 
training? 
Initial training hypothesis  
H1 = Users who receive the security awareness training, Groups A and C, will 
show a positive significant difference in how they respond to testing and mock 
security events after the post-training test in comparison to the Group B. 
Follow-up training question 
Will users who received the security awareness training show a positive 
significant difference in how they respond to mock training with simulated 
scenarios and testing 3, 6, and 9 weeks after the training in comparison to the 
users who received no training?   
Follow-up training hypothesis 
H2 = Users who receive the periodic security awareness training with simulated 
security scenarios will show a positive significant difference after 3, 6, and 9 
weeks in how they respond to re-testing and periodic security training as 
compared to those who do not receive the periodic training and testing. 
Final training question 
Will users who received the security awareness training with simulated security 
scenarios show a positive significant difference in how they respond to the 
training and testing at the end of the training in comparison to the users who 
received no training?   
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Final training hypothesis 
H3 = Users who receive the security awareness training with simulated security 
scenarios and follow up testing (Group A) will show a positive significant 
difference at the end of the study on the final test as compared to the control 
Groups (B, C, and D). 
 
The next section describes the data collection points and the kinds of data that was 
collected during the research study.  At each interval, testing data was collected and analyzed 
to determine the impact of the training with simulated scenarios and testing on the subjects. 
 
Data Collection and Instrumentation 
 
The data collection began with a demographic survey (see Appendix A) followed by a 
pre-training test (see Appendix B).  As mentioned in the previous section, there were four 
groups involved in the experiment.  Group A was the treatment group; Group B was the control 
group who received pre-training tests, interval tests, and a post-training test.  Group C was the 
control group who received only the pre-training test, training but no interval testing, and the 
final test at the end of the experiment.  Group D received only the final test at the conclusion of 
training.  Follow-up interviews were considered, but were not conducted since the results 
obtained from the groups or subjects were not skewed from the other subjects or groups.  
Appendix G has a listing of potential interview questions that could have been asked.   
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Test data was collected at all points along the testing cycles.   Table 4 shows the various 
types of data that were collected at each of the testing points. The next section describes the 
data analysis techniques that were used.   
Table 4 - Data Collected and Data Collection Points 
Data Collected Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Demographic 
Data 
Week 0 
Data from all groups was collected.   The collected data was specific enough 
to identify the individuals involved in the research.  Appendix B contains the 
demographic questions that were used. 
Pre-training 
test 
Week 0 
20 multiple choice questions were delivered to 
Groups A, B, and C.  These were rated on an ordinal 
scale from 1 = least secure, to 5 = most secure. 
No data was 
collected for Group 
D. 
Initial 
simulated 
security 
training 
Post-training 
test 
Week 2 
Subjects in Groups A and C received the initial 
simulated security awareness training.  Groups A, B, 
and C took a post-training test comprised of 20 
multiple choice questions similar in format to the 
pre-training test. 
No training or 
testing was done for 
control Group D. 
Simulated 
security testing 
and training  
Week 5 
Groups A and B received 
additional security testing and 
training.  Another test with 7 
questions was delivered and 
rated just like the pre-training 
test. 
No training or testing was done for 
control Groups C and D. 
Simulated 
security testing 
and training 
Week 8 
Groups A and B received 
additional security testing and 
training.  Another test with 7 
questions was delivered and 
rated just like the pre-training 
test. 
No training or testing was done for 
control Groups C and D. 
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Table 4 - Data Collected and Data Collection Points (cont’d) 
Simulated 
security testing 
and training 
Week 11 
Groups A and B received 
additional security testing and 
training.  Another test with 7 
questions was delivered and 
rated just like the pre-training 
test. 
No training or testing was done for 
control Groups C and D. 
Final test and 
potential 
interviews 
Week 12 
Final test was delivered, containing the same questions as the pre-training 
test (20 multiple choice questions ranked 1-5), to all groups to assess 
what, if any, learning occurred due to the training, to testing alone, and to 
previous knowledge.  Final test interviews were considered for subjects 
that had anomalous results in comparison to other subjects in the same 
group.  These were not done. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
A pilot test (see Table 5) was run using volunteer student subjects.  Students were 
offered extra credit to participate in the study for the course they were currently enrolled.  A 
total of 13 students were recruited and placed in one group, but only 9 of the students 
completed all of the events.  All of the pilot study subjects were run through the entire 
experimental system in a condensed time period.  All subjects answered the demographic 
questions and then took a pre-training test.  Immediately after the pre-training test, all subjects 
received the initial training with simulated security scenarios.  After the initial training they then 
took a post-training test.  All subjects received the periodic training and testing every week, and 
then at the end of 3 weeks, took the final test (follow-up interviews were not performed).   
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Table 5 - Pilot Test Time Line and Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) method (see Appendix D for an example of using the Kruskal-
Wallis test) was used to analyze the pilot test data and final research test data and, to conduct 
an analysis of the hypotheses and null-hypotheses.  For the periodic follow-up testing, the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test was used since the KW method requires at least 3 groups.  The KW 
method makes the following assumptions: (1) Randomly selected groups – each group will be 
randomly selected from the four curriculum alignment V-CoP groups, with 2  faculty subjects 
from each subject-matter area, for 8 subjects per group (see Table 6 below); (2) Independence 
within each sample – each group was comprised of randomly selected subjects that were a 
combination of members from all subject-matter groups; (3) mutual independence across 
groups; (4) measurement scale that is ordinal or numeric – the measurement was based on an 
Time Frame All Subjects 
Start Demographic Questionnaire 
Start Pre-training test 
1 week Security Awareness Training and Post-training test 
2 weeks Simulated security testing and training 
3 weeks Simulated security testing and training 
4 weeks Simulated security testing and training 
4 weeks Final test 
69 
 
ordinal scale of most to least secure (1 to 5); and (5) the selected groups’ computed KW 
values are identical or else yield larger KW values than other groups (Newbold, 2009).   
Table 6 - Number of Subjects in Each Group for the Full Research Study 
Groups 
 
 
Group A 
 
Group B 
 
Group C 
 
Group D 
Subject Matter 
Areas 
Biology   3 subjects 3 subjects 2 subjects 2 subjects 
Chemistry 2 subjects 2 subjects 3 subjects 2 subjects 
Math 2 subjects 2 subjects 2 subjects 2 subjects 
Physics 1 subjects 1 subjects 1 subjects 2 subjects 
Total    8 subjects    8 subjects    8 subjects    8 subjects 
KW will tolerate groups of different sizes and the KW test procedure is approximately valid 
provided that the sample contains at least (5) five observations from each sample group (Newbold, 
2009).  Since the groups consisted of 8 subjects per group, the minimum number is slightly 
exceeded.  Like many non-parametric tests, KW uses the ranks of the data rather than their 
raw values to calculate the test statistic.  The KW non-parametric test makes no assumptions 
about the distribution of the data (Newbold, 2009). 
The null hypothesis of the test was that all KW values are equal and the alternative 
hypothesis is that at least one of the groups yielded larger KW values than at least one of the 
other groups.  If the test result was significant, multiple comparisons could be made between 
the samples.  The comparison was based on a 0.05 level of significance with K-1 (K= number of 
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groups, so K = 3 for this study) degrees of freedom.  All pairwise comparisons are made and the 
probability of each presumed non-difference is indicated. 
Each group was presented with training and a variety of simulated training scenarios 
and appropriate follow-up questions.  The hypothesis of the research was that Group A had a 
larger KW value than the other groups. 
Test data was collected and analyzed after the initial testing to determine the difference 
between the results of the treatment and control groups.  Then, one week after the initial 
training, Groups A and B received additional training with simulated scenarios and follow-up 
testing that included such items as an email that simulated an infection.  If they clicked on the 
attachment, a message would be displayed on their screen saying that they should not have 
attempted to open the file, and other similar events based upon the initial training.  This 
happened again after another week and so on until the test was complete.  Group C and D 
received the final test at the end of the research. 
The data was measured based on ordinal scoring for testing of the training with 
simulated security scenarios through general questions.  The ordinal scoring was scored as 
follows: 5=best possible solution; 4=next best solution; 3=third best solution; 2=fourth best 
solution; 1=weakest solution.  For each simulation presented, the subject responded to a series 
of questions based on the training to determine what solution the subject would pursue.  For 
example, the user was asked to provide a password through a simulated email from their IT 
department.     
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 The test data was then compared between the groups and a statistical analysis of 
responses based on training and no training was performed using the KW method.  Once the 
data had been collected and ranked, comparisons were then made.  Appendices C and D 
contain samples of data and how the data was to be compared at the pre-training test or post-
training test levels.  The assumption was that the pre-training test analysis was different from 
the post-training test analysis. The goal of the study was to see if the training had made a 
significant difference on the experimental group that received the training. 
 
Summary 
 
The overarching purpose of this research is to determine the efficacy and sustained 
benefit of information security awareness training using simulated scenarios to a V-CoP.  The 
results of the study may provide useful feedback that organizations can use to determine if 
security awareness training using simulated scenarios in a web-based environment can help to 
reduce computer security incidences, particularly from viruses.  Proper adherence to security 
guidelines should help to promote a safer environment.  Also, when users are made aware of 
the risks and potential damages from viruses and other forms of computer security breaches 
that can occur when these guidelines are not followed, they should be more likely to follow 
these guidelines.  Knowing the risks in any environment is helpful in producing desired 
responses.   
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Contributions to the field of computer security could be the longer term impact of 
training and retraining of members of a V-CoP.  Other possible contributions would include the 
length of the training as it relates to retention of information security procedures and policies 
and the factor of simulated mock incidence events and how these events are handled by users 
who are exposed to computer security awareness training and users who are not.  There has 
not been enough research into V-CoP and security and this research may lead to further studies 
being performed.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
Introduction 
 
  
The purpose of this research study was to determine the effect of information security 
training with simulated security scenarios and follow-up testing on the awareness of and the 
conformance to standard information security practices and policies within V-CoPs.  The study 
was conducted over a twelve-week period during the summer of 2010.  The subjects were 
college faculty members who participated in a V-CoP in curriculum alignment.  The test data 
was collected through multiple web pages and web sites.  Any data that required a response 
from the subjects was collected using Surveymonkey, and all simulated scenarios and training 
information was delivered through www.tidnet.com, a private web site address.  Demographic 
data and responses to test questions that followed the training and simulated scenarios was 
collected and then analyzed.  Throughout the test data collection, subjects were emailed with 
instructions to access the simulated scenarios, training data, and follow-up testing. 
This chapter discusses how the test data was collected and the test data collection tools 
that were used.  Test data analysis techniques are explained, as is how the test data was 
analyzed in relation to the hypotheses.   
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Organization of Data Analysis 
 
The test data collected are presented in sequential date order and by the research 
subject groups.  First, the test data collected during the pilot study are presented and 
discussed.  Then the test data collected for the full study are presented and discussed.  Screen 
shots of each web page that was viewed by the subjects during the research study are also 
shown. Each section of the testing will be discussed along with the data that was collected 
throughout the testing, including: 
 Pre-training test data for Groups A, B, and C (20 multiple choice questions), 
 Post-training test data for Groups A, B, and C (20 multiple choice questions), 
 Week 3 follow-up testing data for Groups A and C (7 multiple choice questions), 
 Week 6 follow-up testing data for Groups A and C (7 multiple choice questions), 
 Week 9 follow-up testing data for Groups A and C (7 multiple choice questions), 
and 
 Final test data for Groups A, B, C, and D. 
 
Presentation of Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents 
Pilot Study 
 
A pilot study was carried out to determine the efficacy of the training with simulated 
scenarios and follow-up testing.  The pilot study included 13 students from 2 computer-
concepts courses who were recruited specifically to test the functionality and usability of the 
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system.  Only 9 students completed all of the components of the training and testing 
environment.  These results were not analyzed for comparison or for statistical significance 
since all of the pilot-study participants were treated as one group and were presented with all 
parts of the simulated scenarios, training, and testing.  The feedback from the pilot study was 
only positive.  One pilot-study participant commented, “I feel that this was a great survey and I 
had learned a lot and recommend doing it again”, and another said, “This was very interesting”. 
 Table 7 shows the test data collected from the pilot study.  The highlighted subjects did 
not complete all of the sections of the pilot study and their test scores are not included in the 
group totals.  Student participants were able to successfully complete the training and each 
simulated training scenario without additional instructions or any other type of help.  Each 
student was assigned a subject ID and password and they used this ID and password 
throughout the entirety of the pilot study.  The participants who completed all parts of the pilot 
study were about equally spread between the two different courses and included 4 male and 5 
female students.    
The cumulative ranked scores increased slightly from the pre-training test to the post-
training test, after the initial training with simulated scenarios, but essentially stayed the same 
as the pre-training test at the conclusion of the final test.  The pilot study results are similar to 
the full study even though the educational levels of the subjects were different.  This data was 
not analyzed and is presented to show that scores were created for the participants to make 
sure that they completed each section of the pilot-test (see Appendix B for test questions used 
in the pilot study). 
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Table 7 - Pilot Study Data 
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Full Research Study 
Demographic Data 
 
Demographic data and data on the computer experiences of the subjects was collected 
to determine if any differences in the subject groups might have led to differences in study 
results.  Every subject in the study completed the demographic survey through the web 
interface Surveymonkey.com.  Table 8, on the following two pages, summarizes the 
demographic data collected with the responses organized by the four subject groups.  Even 
though there was some variation between the groups, they were fairly homogeneous as one 
would hope following the random assignments to each group.  For example, Group D had a 
higher ratio of men to women than any of the other subject groups and the most consistent age 
range (i.e., all members of Group D were between the ages of 40 and 59).  The overall 
computer literacy of the subjects was higher than the normal everyday computer user, as 
evidenced by the number of computer courses taken and the exposure to virtual interaction 
through online course instruction and the interaction in a V-CoP.    Lastly, the groups are fairly 
evenly distributed on the questions relating to anti-virus software, firewall installation, and 
uploading of files. 
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Table 8 - Demographic Data by Groups 
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Table 8 – Demographic Data by Groups (cont’d) 
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Research Questions and Associated Hypotheses 
 
 As each section of the data collection and analysis is presented, it must be done in the 
context of the research questions and hypotheses originally presented in Chapter 3.   
Initial training 
Will users who receive the security awareness training with simulated security scenarios 
show a positive significant difference in how they respond to the post-training test on 
computer security in comparison to the users who received no training? 
 
First Research Hypothesis - Users who receive the security awareness training 
with simulated security scenarios, Groups A and C, will show a positive 
significant difference in how they respond to testing and security awareness 
scenarios after the post-training test in comparison to the control Group B. 
 
Null Hypothesis – Users who receive the security awareness training with 
simulated security scenarios, Groups A and C will not show a positive significant 
difference in how they respond to testing and training with simulated security 
scenarios after the post-training test in comparison to the control Group B. 
 
3, 6, and 9 weeks after initial training 
Will users who received the security awareness training with simulated security 
scenarios show a positive significant difference in how they respond to the security 
training with simulated security scenarios and testing 3, 6, and 9 weeks after the 
training in comparison to the users who received no training?   
 
Second Research Hypothesis - Users who receive the periodic security 
awareness training with simulated security scenarios, Groups A and B,  will show 
a positive significant difference after 3, 6, and 9 weeks in how they respond to 
re-testing and the training with simulated security scenarios as compared to 
those who do not receive the training and testing. 
 
Null Hypothesis - Users who receive the periodic security awareness training 
with simulated security scenarios, Groups A and B,  will not show a positive 
significant difference after 3, 6, and 9 weeks in how they respond to re-testing 
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and periodic security training with simulated security scenarios as compared to 
those who do not receive the training and testing. 
 
10-weeks after initial training 
Will users who received the security awareness training with simulated security 
scenarios show a positive significant difference in how they respond to the training with 
simulated training scenarios and testing at the end of the training in comparison to the 
users who received no training?   
 
Third Research Hypothesis - Users who receive the security awareness training 
with simulated security scenarios and follow-up training and testing, Group A, 
will show a positive significant difference at the end of the study on the final test 
as compared to the control Groups B, C, and D. 
 
Null Hypothesis 
Users who receive the security awareness training with simulates security 
scenarios and follow-up training and testing, Group A, will not show a positive 
significant difference at the end of the study on the final test as compared to the 
control Groups B, C, and D. 
 
Data Collection Process 
 
 All 32 subjects successfully completed all parts of the study that they were expected to 
complete resulting in no missing data.  Each subject was directed to the security awareness 
training with simulated security scenarios web site (see Figure 1) to begin the training and the 
testing for the research.  The subjects were given a username and password that corresponded 
to their respective group (A, B, C, or D).  After logging in to the web site, the subjects were then 
immediately directed to the demographic survey page (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 1 – Initial Login Screen for All Groups 
  
The demographic survey page was hosted at Surveymonkey and the subjects were 
transferred from the initial login screen to the demographic survey.  The use of the 
Surveymonkey site was transparent to the subjects.  Each subject was given a unique subject ID 
which was based on his/her group.  For example, Subject 1 one in Group A was given the 
subject ID of A1 to be used throughout all of the events that required a login.  The subject IDs 
also ensured that the data was kept anonymous if it were discovered or compromised.   
After the participants completed the demographic survey, they were then directed to 
the next screen (see Figure 3) which thanked them for taking the demographic survey.  Groups 
A, B, and C were directed to the pre-training test screen (see Figure 4) and Group D was not. 
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Figure 2 – Demographic Survey Screen 
 
Figure 3 was just a brief thank-you screen that introduced Groups A, B, and C to the pre-training 
test page.  Group D received the same thank-you screen but did not have the “Click here to 
continue: Pre-training test” link.  Subjects in Group D were just told that they would receive 
more information in the future on the next steps of the research study. 
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Figure 3 – Screen after Demographic Survey Completion 
 
 Once the subjects clicked on the pre-training test link, they were then taken to the 
screen shown in Figure 4.  The pre-training test contained 20 questions that evaluated the 
information technology security literacy of the subjects.  Groups A, B, and C answered the same 
questions, and this data was collected and analyzed using the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine if 
any initial difference existed between the three groups.  After completion of the pre-training 
test, Groups A and C were then directed to the security awareness initial training site (see 
Figure 5) and completed the initial training with simulated scenarios.  Group B was directed to a 
web page that thanked them for taking the pre-training test and informed them that they 
would be contacted in the future for further requirements of the research study. 
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Figure 4 – Pre-training Test Screen 
 
 Figure 5 shows the screen of the initial security awareness training with simulated 
scenarios for Groups A and C.  The training consisted of multiple sections and Figures 5 through 
Figure 18 shows all of the screens.  The first screen consisted of information letting the subjects 
know what they would be seeing and approximately how long the training and testing would 
take.  After the initial screen, the subjects were shown two more screens of information about 
information security (see Figures 6 and 7).  Figure 6 included general information on computer 
security, and Figure 7 contained examples of security breaches that were included to reinforce 
the concept of using deterrence theory as a method of stimulating users to use sound 
information security practices. 
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Figure 5 – Initial Security Training Introduction Screen 
 
 
Figure 6 – Initial Training Overview Screen 1 
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Figure 7 – Initial Training Overview Screen 2 
  
Figure 8 included one of the first simulated scenarios in the training.  The simulation link 
directed users to the Microsoft password simulation website (see Figure 9) where users entered 
either their own passwords or experimented with password samples to see the difference 
between a weak and strong password.  This site was opened in a new window so that the 
subjects would not get lost or out of order when they were moving through the training web 
pages. 
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Figure 8 – Initial Training Part I 
 
 
Figure 9 – Password Checking Site 
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 After the subjects concluded the Microsoft password site, they were directed to Part II 
of the security training.  Part II included two subject areas, file sharing and management, and 
email use (see Figure 10).  Each section contained a link to a simulated scenario that required 
the subject to respond to a simulated file sharing scenario (see Figure 11) and to an email with 
a potentially virus-infected file (see Figure 12).  Depending on how the subject responded to the 
scenario determined whether they received positive or negative feedback.   
 
Figure 10 – Initial Training Part II 
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Figure 11 – File Sharing Simulation 
 
 
Figure 12 – Email Simulation 
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 Next the subjects were taken to Part III of the training as shown in Figure 13.  Part III 
covered virus prevention and phishing attacks.  The virus prevention section contained a link 
from the email virus section to a simulated scenario.  Figure 14 shows the email virus 
simulation, and Figure 15 shows the phishing simulation.  The virus simulation presented the 
subjects with a screen from the V-CoP with a file that they should not download.  The screen 
asked them to download the file and if they clicked on the file they were presented with a 
warning screen that discussed why they should not have tried to download the file.  The 
phishing simulated scenario in Figure 15 tried to get the subjects to click on a link to go to 
another page.  If they were not paying attention, they would click on a link that would take 
them to a bogus site that would seek to gather further information from them.  The link is 
spelled incorrectly and, if they did not notice this they received further information on why they 
should not have clicked on the link. 
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Figure 13 – Initial Training Part III 
 
 
Figure 14 – Virus Simulation Screen 
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Figure 15 – Phishing Simulation Screen 
 
 Part IV (see Figure 16) of the training covered the last four sections of the information 
security training.  This section covered data and data storage device disposal, social 
engineering, work space security, and mobile device security.  The only part that contained a 
simulated scenario was social engineering since this part was most relevant to V-CoPs.  Figure 
17 shows the social engineering simulated scenario.  This simulation played a recorded message 
coming from a supposed member of the IT Department.  If for some reason their system did not 
play the message the subjects had the option of clicking on a link that would have shown the 
recorded message in a text box on the screen.  They were then asked to respond to the 
recorded message by clicking on “yes” or “no” if they thought that they should provide the 
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information requested.  After the simulated scenario, the subjects were directed to the 
conclusion screen of the initial training as shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 16 – Initial Training Part IV 
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Figure 17 – Social Engineering Screen 
 
 
Figure 18 – Initial Training Conclusion Screen 
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 Approximately one week after the conclusion of the pre-training test, subjects from 
Groups A, B, and C were sent an email with a link to the post-training test as seen in Figure 19.  
This page explained to the subjects that they would be taking an information security test with 
20 questions.  The post-training test consisted of questions that covered the same topics as the 
pre-training test.  The test data collected is presented in the next section for the pre- and post-
training tests.  After completion of the post-training test, the subjects were taken to another 
thank-you screen as shown in Figure 21 and informed that they would be contacted in the 
future for upcoming events.   
 
Figure 19 – Post-training Test Initial Screen 
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Figure 20 – Post-training Test Screen 
 
 
Figure 21 – Post-training Test Conclusion Screen 
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 Three weeks after the completion of the post-training test, Groups A and B were sent an 
email directing them to the next phase of the training.  This first follow-up training, as seen in 
Figure 22, reviewed some information that the subjects were exposed to in the initial security 
awareness training.  After the subjects read the information on this first screen, they were sent 
to another screen (see Figure 23) that contained a bogus email simulation that attempted to 
extract confidential data from the subjects.  If the subjects clicked on the fields to enter the 
data, a screen popped up with a warning that discussed the problems with replying to an email 
of this type, specifically that the Information Technology Department would not ask for this 
type of information.  After they completed the simulated scenario, they were directed to a 
seven question test that checked their understanding and level of learning (see Figure 24).  
After the test, the subjects were sent to a conclusion screen (see Figure 25) thanking them for 
completing the first follow-up training with a simulated scenario and follow-up testing and 
informing them that they would again be contacted in the future for the next event.   
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Figure 22 - Follow Up Training - Week 3 Screen (page 1) 
 
 
Figure 23 - Follow Up Training - Week 3 Simulation Screen 
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Figure 24 - Follow Up Training - Week 3 Test Screen 
 
 
Figure 25 - Follow Up Training - Week 3 Conclusion Screen 
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 Three weeks later, Groups A and B were sent an email with a link to the next follow-up 
information security awareness training with a simulated scenario and follow-up testing event 
(see Figure 26).  This next event discussed the importance of having and enforcing a security 
policy and shared some examples of breaches that might result.  Included on this page was 
another simulated scenario that checked the subjects’ understanding of a phishing attempt (see 
Figure 27).  Once again, the subjects were presented with an audio presentation that simulated 
a member of the Human Resources Department who claimed to need some information to 
process the subject’s W2 form.  Similar to the initial training with simulated scenarios scenario 
from the initial training event the subjects were asked to respond whether they should (“yes”) 
or should not (“no”) provide the information.  If they selected “yes”, they received a message 
that stated that they should not have provided the requested information.  If they selected 
“no”, they received a message praising them for their safe selection.  After they completed the 
simulated scenario, they were taken to a seven question test that contained questions on 
information security (see Figure 28).  After answering the questions, they were then thanked 
(see Figure 29) and informed of future upcoming events. 
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Figure 26 - Follow Up Training - Week 6 Screen (page 1) 
 
 
Figure 27 - Follow Up Training - Week 6 Simulation Screen 
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Figure 28 - Follow Up Training - Week 6 Test Screen 
 
 
Figure 29 - Follow Up Training - Week 6 Conclusion Screen 
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 The final follow-up training with a simulated scenario event was an email notice that 
was sent three weeks after the previous event.  The email contained a link that directed the 
subjects from Groups A and B to the web page shown in Figure 30.  Like the other follow-up 
training events, the page covered some information on information security and the risks of not 
following sound information security practices.  After the subjects read the information on this 
screen they were directed to a simulated scenario (see Figure 31) which included a screen from 
a V-Cop.  The subjects were asked to download a file from the simulated page of the V-Cop and 
if they attempted to do so, were presented with a warning pop-up screen explaining why they 
made a mistake.  Once they completed the simulated scenario, they were taken to another 
seven-question test (see Figure 32) and then to a thank-you screen (see Figure 33).  
 
Figure 30 - Follow Up Training - Week 9 Screen (page 1) 
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Figure 31 - Follow Up Training - Week 9 Simulation Screen 
 
 
Figure 32 - Follow Up Training - Week 9 Test Screen 
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Figure 33 - Follow Up Training - Week 9 Conclusion Screen 
 
 One week after the third training event, Groups A, B, C, and D were sent an email that 
took them to the final test screen as seen in Figure 34.  The screen had a link to the actual test 
which contained 20 questions that were identical to the pre-training test taken at the beginning 
of the research study (see Figure 35).  Once they completed the final test, they were taken to a 
conclusion screen (see Figure 36) where they were thanked for their participation in the 
research study.   
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Figure 34 - Final Test Introduction Screen 
 
 
Figure 35 - Final Test Screen 
 
108 
 
 
Figure 36 - Final Test Conclusion Screen 
 
Analysis of Data 
 
This section contains the data that was collected and the statistical results obtained 
from the research study.  The mean, median, and standard deviation were computed for each 
subject across all questions and for each question across all subjects.  Once the data was 
collected for a test, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine if the corresponding null 
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected for tests with three or more groups.       
The first set of data was collected from the pre-training test administered to Groups A, 
B, and C prior to any security training with simulated scenarios.  The subjects were given a 
three-day window to take the pre-training test.  Table 9 shows the summary results and 
Appendix C, Table 28, contains the collected scores for every subject and question for the pre-
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training test.  Each question had five multiple-choice answers, and the answers were ranked 
from 1 to 5, 1 for the least secure answer, and 5 for the most secure.   The answers were 
ranked based on the literature review in Chapter 2, specifically from the information taken 
from the SANS web site (SANS.org, 2005). 
Table 9 - Pre-training Test Summary Data 
 
 
The mean scores over all the questions were identical for Groups A and B, and slightly 
lower for Group C.  The questions that have lower than average results across all groups are 
questions 6, 18, and 20.  These questions are located in Appendix B and the scores for these 
questions can be found in Table 28 in Appendix C.  The average score across all groups was 2.26 
for question 6, 2.72 for question 18, and 2.42 for question 20.  Question 6 deals with data 
sharing, question 18 with passwords, and question 20 with the average cost of an information 
security breach.  These three questions cover information security topics that were covered in 
the information security training that took place after the pre-training test that may require 
further focus.  Question 20 is very specific and would require specific knowledge of the dollar 
cost of an information security breach which would not be commonly known.  The other two 
questions also deal with issues that are not about basic information security awareness.   
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Even though the mean scores for these questions were lower than the other questions, 
the Kruskal Wallis rank-order testing revealed that there was no significance difference 
between the groups in the pre-training test.  The results of the pre-training test suggest that 
the subject groups are very similar in their performance, making for more reliable data analysis 
that is not skewed by any of the subject groups.   As the research progressed to the training 
with simulated scenarios, this similarity in scores provided a good foundation for data analysis.   
Table 10 shows the results from the test using the Excel PhStat add-in at the 5% level of 
significance.  The statistical test results were also computed manually.  The results were 
identical as expected, providing assurance that the Kruskal-Wallis test was being performed 
properly.  The pre-training test was not used to test a hypothesis, but to verify the similarity of 
the groups when looking at the post-training test and the final test.   
Table 10 - Pre-training Test Kruskal Wallis Test Results 
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 The next set of summary data shown in Table 11 comes from the post-training test 
which followed the initial training with simulated scenarios for Groups A and C and the pre-
training test for Group B. The scores for each subject and question can be found in Table 28 
located in Appendix C.   
Table 11 - Post-training Test Summary Data 
 
 
 The post-training test responses were analyzed using standard summary statistics (see 
Table 29, Appendix C) and the Kruskal-Wallis test.  The questions that showed the lowest 
overall average scores were numbers 4, 6, 17, and 18.  Question 4 dealt with file sharing and 
shows a 1 point difference between Group B, which had a mean score of 2.63, and Group C, 
which had a mean score of 3.63.  Since Group B did not receive the initial training with 
simulated scenarios, lower scores would have been expected.  This may mean that more 
attention may need to be paid to file sharing in future security awareness training or simulated 
scenarios, or this difference could have been caused by a misunderstanding of the question 
and/or answers.  The scores for question 6 were lower for all of the groups when compared to 
all of the other questions.  Questions 17 and 18 have lower scores for Group B and covered 
material that may have been well known to the traditional user.  Question 17 is about data 
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management, and question 18 is about password length.  Since Group B did not receive the 
initial training, this may be the cause of these lower scores.   
Table 12 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the post-training test.  Even 
though no significant difference was detected and the null hypothesis was not rejected, a 
difference did exist between Group B, a control group, and experimental Group A and control 
Group C.  Both Groups A and C have higher mean scores and lower standard deviations. 
Table 12 - Kruskal Wallis Post-Training Test Results at 5% 
 
 The p-value of 0.0934 for the post-training test reveals that for a higher level of 
significance such as 0.10, the results would have lead to reject the null hypothesis.  Table 13 
shows the Kruskal Wallis post-training test at 0.10.  The training with simulated scenarios did 
make some difference from the pre- to the post-training test, even if that difference was not 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 13 - Kruskal Wallis Post-Training Test Results at 10% 
 
 
Table 14 shows the pre- and post-training test overall mean, median and standard 
deviation for Groups A, B and C.  There was a positive change in the scores of Groups A and C 
after the training.  Specifically, the mean scores increased for both Groups A and C by 0.25.  This 
change, compared to Group B, is noticeable since Group B showed no change between the pre-
training test and post-training test means. 
Table 14 - Pre and Post-training Test Scores 
 
 
The next set of collected data, Table 15, is from the first follow-up testing that took 
place approximately three weeks after the post-training test.  Only Groups A and B received the 
follow-up training with a simulated event and testing.   
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Table 15 - Follow-Up Testing Data, Week 3 
 
 
 With only two groups to compare, the Wilcoxon rank sum test was used.  The overall 
mean score for both groups showed only a difference of 0.20.  Also, examining the individual 
questions in the table, the differences between the lowest rank score and the highest rank 
score for the entire test was not as substantial as the pre- or post-training test.  Overall, Group 
A did score higher on the test.  The results of the Wilcoxon rank sum test are seen in Table 16.  
Even though Group A received the initial online simulated information security training, there 
was no significant difference at the 5% level of significance, so the null hypothesis was not 
rejected.  Questions 2 and 3, which focus on phishing and social engineering, showed the 
biggest differences of 0.75 and 0.62.  In both cases, Group A scored higher on the tests which 
may show that the initial training with simulated security scenarios had a greater impact.    
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Table 16 - Week 3 Follow-Up Test Results 
 
 
Three weeks after the follow-up training for Week 3, another training with a simulated 
scenario and testing event was completed by Groups A and B.  Table 17 shows the data from 
the Week 6 test.  Even though Group A scored slightly higher than Group B, the gap narrowed 
when compared to the difference shown after the Week 3 follow-up test.  The difference in the 
means was only 0.03, as compared to 0.20 from Week 3.  The biggest difference in question 
scores occurred for question 4 which dealt with phishing.  Group A had a higher score, with a 
difference of 0.87 for question 4.  This may be a result of the initial training which had several 
sections that could be applied to this question. 
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Table 17 - Follow-Up Testing Data, Week 6 
 
 
 The Wilcoxon Rank sum test was again used to analyze the test results data and to determine if 
there was a significant difference between the two groups.  Table 18 shows that there was not a 
significant difference so the null hypothesis was not rejected and we reject the second research 
hypothesis that there was a significant difference between the groups after the Week 6 online training 
with a simulated scenario, and testing event on information security.     
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Table 18 - Week 6 Follow-Up Test Results 
 
 
However, when we compare the results from the Week 3 and Week 6 training with simulated 
scenario and follow-up testing, we do see a slight difference as shown in Table 19.  But the difference is 
slightly negative for both Groups A and B, since their average scores dropped between the two tests.  
This could be in part due to the differences in the training and testing event or it could be attributable to 
the length of time between the initial training with simulated scenarios and the follow-up testing results. 
Table 19 - Week 3 and Week 6 Test Results 
 
 
Three weeks after the Week 6 test, the final follow-up training with a simulated scenario and 
testing event took place.  Groups A and B completed the training and testing.  Table 20 shows the data 
that was collected from the Week 9 testing.  The mean score changed slightly between the 2 groups 
from 0.03 from Week 6 to 0.40 for Week 9, the largest difference computed for all three training with 
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simulated scenarios and testing events.  The biggest difference in scores occurred for question 7.  Group 
A had a mean score of 4.25 and Group B had a mean score of 3.25 for the question which deals with 
phishing.  There seems to be a common thread for Week 3, 6, and 9 testing.  Perhaps further training 
and testing is needed for phishing and social engineering.  However, even though this difference exists, 
the scores are still strong across the test with an overall mean of 4.63 for Group A and 4.23 for Group B. 
Table 20 - Follow-Up Testing Data, Week 9 
 
 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to compare the results for Groups A and B on the Week 9 
follow-up test.  Table 21 indicates that the data did not show a significant difference between the 
groups, so the null hypothesis was not rejected and the second research question is not confirmed.  The 
p-value was relatively low so running the test at a 7% level of significance would have produced a 
different conclusion and the null hypothesis would have been rejected.   
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Table 21 - Week 9 Follow-Up Test Results 
 
 
 
The complete follow-up training and testing results are summarized in Table 22 which shows the 
summary data statistics across all three tests. 
Table 22 - Week 3, 6, and 9 Summary Data Statistics  
 
 
We see from this table that the changes in the mean, median and standard deviation of the 
scores were minimal, with a slight drop and then rise for Group A.  The same trend occurred for Group 
B.  Group A did recover to a higher level than Group B at the conclusion of the Week 9 training with 
simulated scenarios and testing event.  The standard deviation stayed the same for Group A and 
changed slightly for Group B.  At first glance this seems to indicate that the training and testing had no 
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effect on the subjects.  However, another possible way to look at these results may be to show the 
consistency of scores for Group A.  The subjects were consistent across the three events. Since Group A, 
the experimental group, maintained the higher score values throughout the testing, it may be concluded 
that the initial training with simulated scenarios did make some positive difference. 
 The data from the final test is presented last.  The final test was taken by all four groups.  Group 
D completed the demographic survey and took the final test, and was used as one of the control groups 
to determine the effect that may be caused by partial training and testing.  The final test contained the 
exact same questions as the pre-training test to ensure that the same data was being tested.  There was 
a time span of about twelve weeks between the pre-training test and the final test.  Table 23 shows the 
summary data from the final test.  The complete listing of scores for each subject and for each question 
can be found in Appendix C, Table 30.  The results did not show a significant difference between 
the groups, even for Group D who did not receive any previous testing or training.   
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Table 23 - Final Test Summary Results 
 
 
The final analysis of the data using the Kruskal-Wallis test did not show a significant 
difference at the 5% level so the null hypothesis was not rejected.  The third research 
hypothesis is not confirmed, which implies that there was no significant difference between the 
groups’ mean scores.  Table 24 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test.  The p-value is 
almost equal to 1.0 which further confirmed the results. 
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Table 24 - Final Test Results 
 
 
Table 25 shows the final results of all the groups for the final test and Groups A, B, and C 
on the pre-training test, post-training test, and the final test at the end of the research study.  It 
is interesting to note that the scores on the pre-training test were almost identical to the final 
test which was composed of the exact same questions.  This lack of improvement from the 
experimental group could be attributable to a number of reasons.  Perhaps the subjects 
thought too much about the answers or did not spend an adequate amount of time on the final 
test and rushed through the questions.  What is most fascinating is the lack of significant 
difference between the experimental Group A and control Group D who had received no 
security testing or training before taking the final test.  The means for Groups A and D differ by 
only 0.04 (Group A had a mean of 4.03 and Group D 3.99).  Perhaps the level of knowledge of 
Group D exceeded that of the other groups, or perhaps the training with simulated scenarios 
and testing did not impact the subjects as hypothesized.  However, even though the scores of 
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the groups did not increase significantly, they also did not decrease which would lead one to 
believe that the training with simulated scenarios and follow-up testing at least kept the scores 
from dropping over time.  Further examination and research is warranted as explained in 
Chapter 5. 
Table 25 - Final Comparison of Groups 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Recap of the Study 
 
The purpose of the research study was to examine the effects of information security 
awareness training with simulated scenarios and follow-up testing on members of a V-CoP.  The 
literature revealed a general lack of security awareness training but, through proper security 
controls accompanied by security awareness education, this trend can be diminished 
(Whitman, 2004).  The research questions asked if the security awareness training with 
simulated scenarios and follow-up testing would improve the scores on information security 
tests, specifically after repeated training and testing were done over an approximately twelve-
week time period.  The underlying assumption was that scores on information security tests are 
directly related to information security awareness and conformance.  Deterrence theory was 
used as the grounded theory as subjects were educated on the security threats and their 
negative impact and consequences throughout the training and simulated scenarios. 
The community that was used for this research consisted of faculty members that are 
part of a V-CoP for curriculum alignment with the University of Central Florida’s Regional 
Campuses and were equally distributed among the four research groups.  The data was 
collected in the following order: demographic data was collected for all 32 subjects (see 
Appendix A); Groups A, B, and C took a pre-training test to assess their initial knowledge of 
information security awareness (see Appendix B); Groups A and C completed the initial 
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simulated security training (see Chapter 4); Groups A, B, and C then completed a post-training 
test after the initial training made up of questions very similar to the pre-training test 
questions; Groups A and C then participated in follow-up training with simulated scenarios and 
testing events at 3 weeks, 6 weeks, and 9 weeks after the post-training test taken after the 
initial training with simulated scenarios; the last event was the final test which was taken by all 
of the groups approximately one week after the Week 9 follow-up training and testing event.  
The training events and tests were created from the information presented in the Chapter 2 
literature review.  The test questions were created based on the information gleaned from the 
SANS Institute (SANS.org, 2009), the new information security taxonomy by Kjaerland 
(Kjaerland, 2006; CERT/CC, 2004), and the 2003 CSI/FBI survey on Computer Crime and Security 
Survey (Whitman, 2004).   
Findings 
 
 From the data presented in Chapter 4, and the preliminary analysis of that data, it was 
determined that the security awareness training with simulated security scenarios and follow-
up testing did not produce enough of an improvement in the information security awareness 
test scores to reject all of the null hypotheses at the 5% level of significance.  However, 
between the pre- and post-training test the null hypotheses would have been rejected at the 
10% level of significance.  The statistical power of the tests is low as the number of subjects was 
relatively small in each group.  Nevertheless, the Kruskal-Wallis test procedure is approximately 
valid since the sample groups all contain more than five subjects (observations).  
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Some of the implications from the findings could be that the training may not be useful 
for long term change in security awareness for members of a V-CoP.  It may also mean that the 
simulated scenarios were not effective and may not be necessary for security awareness 
training.  The use of deterrence theory may not be as effective as using a theory that does not 
focus on the detrimental effects of information security breaches.  A less educated and 
experienced target group may provide for different results than the group used for this study as 
shown by their initially high test scores.  Lastly, this type of training with simulated scenarios 
may not be effective on more educated V-CoP members and other methods or levels of training 
may be more effective.  Either way, further research is needed. 
 A graphic representation of the data found in Table 25 is shown in Figure 37.  The chart shows 
the overall scores for Group A, the experimental group, and any changes in test results for control 
Groups B, C, and D.  Group A did show an increase in results from the pre-training test until the drop in 
the mean score at the Week-6 test, and then the mean test score increased at the Week-9 test and 
then, after completing the final test, returned to almost the identical scores as the pre-training test.  
Group D, who received no simulated information security awareness training, scored at almost the same 
level as Group A, who received all of the information security awareness training and testing.  The 
questions in the pre-training test and the final test were identical except for randomization of the 
answer choices.  Group B did not receive the initial simulated information security awareness training 
and showed an upward trend in performance between the post-training test and Week 3 follow-up test.   
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Figure 37 - Bar Chart of Test Score Data 
 
Confidence intervals were calculated at the 95% confidence level for each group for each test that 
they completed (see Table 26).  Confidence intervals were also computed for each test for all of the 
groups (see Table 31 in Appendix G).  The confidence intervals are relatively wide since the sample sizes 
are modest.  It is therefore not surprising that the tests of hypotheses showed no statistically significant 
difference at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 26 – Confidence Intervals at 95% 
 
The following three figures show the test score trend lines for Groups A, B, and C.  The trend 
lines show the mean scores for each test taken by the specified group.  The pre-training test, post-
training test, and final test contained 20 questions, and the Week 3, Week 6 and Week 9 tests contained 
7 questions each (see Appendix B).   The scores for Groups A and B dipped slightly at Week 6, and then 
improved slightly at Week 9.  But, even with these slight changes in results between the various tests 
and groups, the overall changes show that no significant changes occurred between the experimental 
group and the control groups at the 0.05 level.  The exception to this was when the level of significance 
for the post-training test was changed to 0.10, at which time the null hypothesis was rejected that there 
was no difference between the scores of the groups.  Group A and Group C did show an improvement in 
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their mean scores of 0.25 on a 5 point scale.  Even though at the 0.05 level there was no significant 
difference between the groups’ means, there was also no decrease in performance of Group A with 
even a slight increase between the pre-training test and final test as shown in Figure 38.  There was an 
increase in test performance for the Groups A and B who received the initial training with simulated 
scenarios.  This seems to show that the training was at least temporarily effective in improving 
information security awareness. 
 
 
Figure 38 - Line Graph of Group A Data 
 
Group B did not receive the initial information security simulated awareness training and pre-
training testing which would explain the identical scores recorded for Group B for the pre-training test 
and post-training test.  After Group A and B received the follow-up Week 3 training, their test scores 
increased and stayed higher, even though the increase was not significant enough to reject the null 
hypothesis.   However, between Group A and Group B, there was an initial improvement in scores after 
the Week-3 training.  Group B’s scores remained flat between the pre-training information security 
130 
 
awareness test and the post-training test, while A showed an increase between the initial pre-training 
test and post-training test following the training (as previously discussed). 
 
Figure 39 - Line Graph of Group B Data 
 
 Group C received the initial training and testing, but no follow up training and testing.  
There was a difference in results from the pre-training test to the post-training test, but the 
final test score dropped.  Even though the scores dropped they were slightly higher than the 
pre-training test scores.  It could be presumed that the time frame between the post-training 
test and final test caused the drop in performance, but Group A showed a similar pattern in 
results which might negate this assumption.  Further study needs to be done to see if increased 
or decreased time intervals between events would make a greater difference or if the 
information covered in the simulated events needs to be modified to address any discrepancies 
among the questions.  As noted in Chapter 4, the questions that showed the greatest difference 
between groups were those questions that covered phishing and social engineering.     
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Figure 40 - Line Graph of Group C Data 
 
The patterns for Groups A, B, and C across the tests show that an initial increase in 
performance was recorded once the groups completed one of the information security 
awareness training with simulated scenarios events.  Once this was achieved, the scores 
eventually declined to almost the same test scores recorded at the beginning of the research 
study. It may be posited that the length of the information security awareness training with 
simulated scenarios that occurred after the pre-training test produced greater results than the 
shorter periodic training events.  There was a minor drop in scores at Week 6 which then 
returned to higher scores at Week 9.  Figure 41 shows the scores for Groups A, B, and C for the 
initial pre-training test, post-training test, and the final test.  Experimental Group A and control 
Group C showed an initial increase in test scores from the pre-training test and post-training 
test.  Both Groups A and C were given the initial security training.  Group B had no change 
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between the pre-training test and post-training test, but did show an increase at the final test 
after completing the follow-up training and testing events.   
 
Figure 41 – Groups A, B, and C Test Scores 
 
 
Conclusions 
 Ultimately the results are not conclusive, and do not show that the information security 
awareness training with simulated scenarios and follow-up testing produced lasting significant 
increases in test score performance.  There was a change between the pre- and post-training 
test for the groups, and Groups A and C did show a difference at the 10% level of significance.  
This may imply that the groups who received the initial training did show some improvement 
but, this improvement practically vanished by the end of the research study at the final test.  At 
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the 5% level, the findings throughout showed that the null hypotheses were not rejected and 
that no significant difference existed between the experimental and control groups.  Therefore, 
all of the research hypotheses cannot be confirmed except at the 10% level for the first 
research hypothesis that there would be a significant difference between the groups that 
received the information security awareness training.  Even after close examination of the 
demographic data, there is no substantial difference between the groups and they are 
comparatively equally represented by their computer experience and background.    
A noticeable attribute of the groups is the relatively high scores from the outset of the 
research study.  There was little variance between the groups, with the lowest mean of any 
group equal to 3.95 out of 5 and the highest mean of any group equal to 4.63 out of 5.  Table 27 
shows the means of the groups for the tests and the means of all of the groups and all of the 
tests.  From this table we can see that the differences are not significant particularly for the 
final test.  The range of scores on the final test differs by only 0.06 between the lowest and 
highest values.  This was unexpected as the assumption was that the subject who received the 
simulated information security awareness training and testing would have had higher test 
scores.   
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Table 27 - Mean Scores for All Groups and All Tests 
 
 
From the literature review in Chapter 2, the concept of applying deterrence theory, that 
organizations can reduce computer abuse by implementing standard security policy measures 
such as anti-virus systems, password protection schemes, rigorous enforcement of computer 
security policies, and fostering security awareness in employees through special security 
education (Lee, 2003) was not proven to be necessarily true.  Also, Whitman posited that 
awareness of security risks and the necessary education and training about information security 
and organizations needs to be increased to avoid accidental and careless mistakes and to 
increase the effectiveness of their security policies (Whitman, 2004).  This statement by 
Whitman was not proven to be necessarily true from this research study.  Even though the 
research did not prove that simulated security awareness training and testing significantly 
increased the performance of the subjects from the beginning to the end, the commitment to 
training end users on information security is still needed.  Perhaps if the simulated information 
security awareness and compliance training had not been performed, then the test results 
would have decreased over time.  Also, according to the 2009 CSI/FBI survey, 53 percent of the 
respondents say that their organizations allocate 5 percent or less of their overall information 
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technology budget to information security, and 42 percent spend less than 1 percent of their 
security dollars on awareness programs which is an alarmingly low expenditure rate when you 
consider the cost of dealing with security breaches (Richardson, 2008).  The fact that 
approximately $0.50 for every $1,000 spent on information technology is spent on information 
security reveals the need for more focus on awareness education, training, and continuous and 
random testing.  This statement needs further analysis and modification to account for the 
results of the study, but that does not imply that the training is not needed or could not be 
effective.  To this end, members of a V-CoP must be properly trained and tested to ensure that 
they not only understand the major security issues of any information system, but that they 
follow these policies.  Von Solms and Von Solms acknowledged that users cannot be held 
responsible for security problems if they are not told what such security problems are and what 
they should do to prevent them (Von Solms and Von Solms, 2004).  This means that the training 
is needed, but the form and delivery may need to be modified until the desired results are 
obtained.  This may also have implications for the utilization of simulation.  In a simulated 
environment, users can be exposed to simulated security incidences and threats without 
compromising their systems or their organizations’ systems.  Organizations do not want their 
employees to learn proper information security practices the hard way by opening an infected 
email that contains a live virus that would infect their system.  Lastly, information security will 
continue to be a major focus that organizations need to address and also that the primary 
causes of information security breaches are end-user carelessness and mistakes (Baker, 2008), 
which necessitates computer security awareness training and compliance testing.   
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Future Research 
  
This dissertation suggests that there are a number of areas for further research that 
should be done.  The following information will address each area of potential future research, 
why this research is important, and a rationale for each recommendation.   
To check for the effect of simulation on the groups another research study could be 
done with the experimental group receiving the training with the simulated scenarios and the 
control group receiving the training without the simulated scenarios.  This would help to 
determine if the simulation used in the study would make a positive difference on how the 
experimental group responded to the follow-up testing.  This study would not require making 
any changes to the system and could be combined with some of the other possible future 
research areas. 
Since this study was done using a highly educated and computer savvy group of 
subjects, future research should look at a mix of backgrounds.  Including less educated subjects 
with more educated subjects that are involved in a V-CoP may produce different results.  This 
research would be useful to determine what effect education has on information security 
awareness training retention.  Since many organizations are staffed with individuals that at 
most possess a bachelor’s degree, this research would be directly beneficial to employers with 
V-CoP’s staffed with employees with less formal education, since the subjects of this research 
possessed at least a master’s degree.  Also, employees with basic computer skills may provide 
different results, since a majority of the subjects in this research had taken at least one 
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computer class (29/32), owned two or more computers (26/32), and  almost half of the subjects 
had taken a computer programming course (14/32) which shows a more advanced level of 
computing knowledge.  Almost any piece of information collected from the demographic survey 
could be further examined by focusing on that particular demographic identifier but for the 
purpose of future research, suggesting only more or less knowledge of computer systems 
would be recommended.   
The research subjects were faculty from higher education which narrows the findings to 
this particular group from the science fields making it difficult to extrapolate the results to 
other groups or groups that are comprised of members from a more varied environment.  Even 
if another study were to be done using college staff rather than college faculty, the results may 
be different.  The research did not take into account diversity of job roles and further study 
would be useful, even within an educational framework, to determine if members of V-CoPs 
that included subjects of varying job roles and/or responsibilities might result in different 
findings.  This may be particularly useful in a non-educational setting, such as a corporation that 
is widely engaged in the use of V-CoPs and needs to ensure that valuable information is kept 
secure.  Simulated information security awareness training and compliance testing would be 
particularly important in organizations where confidentiality and secrecy are critical and 
necessary to the operation of the organization (such as the Department of Defense, research 
and development groups, etc.). 
The length of time of the study could be adjusted to be either longer or shorter since 
the subjects improved from the pre- to post-training test after the lengthy initial simulated 
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information security awareness training.  This could be applied not only to the overall length of 
the study, but to the length of the training with simulated scenarios events.  If the initial 
simulated information security awareness training was the cause of the improvement in the 
testing scores between the pre- and post-training tests, then determining the length of each 
event to maximize effect would be useful.  Also, extending the length of the research study to a 
year or longer, may reveal different results than were obtained by looking at a twelve-week 
time frame.  Pinpointing the optimum time frame may provide significant benefits and keep 
organizations from wasting time, money, and other valuable scarce resources.  Also, in a longer 
time period, the number and length of events could be adjusted to maximize the effect of the 
training with simulated scenarios and testing. 
Also, increasing the fidelity of the simulations used in the training and testing should be 
examined to determine if a more advanced and more interactive simulation would change the 
results of the research.  Increased fidelity may assist organizations in determining what level of 
fidelity is needed to obtain the maximum impact from training with simulated scenarios and 
testing on V-CoPs or on any user group.  The training with simulated scenarios and testing, if 
successfully adjusted to the maximum fidelity levels, could even be commercialized and used in 
any organization to train its employees in proper security practices and to reinforce the security 
policy of the organization. 
 Lastly, the information security awareness training with simulated scenarios and testing could 
be modified to be intelligent, adapting to the particular needs of the subject.  Adaptive training has been 
used when a subject is not performing at the desired level in a certain information security subject area.  
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To improve their score, more training could automatically be provided in the specific problem area.  
Each test question missed could be used to provide further training until the user scores at the specified 
level.  In one research article, adaptive training was found to produce substantial and sustained gains in 
students that were engaged in the adaptive training, even six months after the training (Denning, et al., 
2009).  
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
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Demographic Survey 
 
 
Each numbered item records information that will be used in the study. No identifying 
information will be collected or distributed. 
 
For questions with a dropdown box make sure to click on the down arrow and select the 
appropriate answer. 
 
When you have completed the survey, click on the Done button at the end and you will 
be returned to the training web site. 
 
1. Subject ID: (type in the ID you were emailed) 
2. Gender (Male or Female) 
3. Age (click on the down arrow to select an age range):  
4. Current Occupation (click on the down arrow to select an occupation): 
5. If faculty, current teaching area: 
6. Highest level of education: 
7. Number of computer classes taken: 
8. Type of computer classes taken: 
9. How many computers do you own? 
10. How would you rate your experience with computers? 
11. How often do you check email? 
12. How often do you use instant messaging (IM)?Demographic Survey 
13. How often do you use Internet research for classes or work? 
14. Do you use any social networking sites? 
15. If you use social networking sites, which of the following do you use (select all that 
apply)? 
16. Do you upload files on to the web? 
17. If you upload files, how often? 
18. Do you have anti-virus software installed on your home computer? 
19. If you have anti-virus software installed, is it up to date (do you update the software at 
least monthly)? 
20. Do you have a firewall or other device installed to protect your home computer? 
21. If you have a firewall or other device, what type is it? 
22. Have you ever had your computer infected by a computer virus, or had someone 
23. hack your computer? 
24. If your computer was infected, what type of infection was it? 
25. Do you have your own web site that you manage? 
26. How often do you change your password for accessing password protected sites? 
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Pre-Training Test and Final Test 
 
Answer each of the following questions by selecting the letter of the answer that you 
think is correct. Select only one answer for each question. Use the drop down box to the 
right of each question to select your answer (a, b, c, d, or e) 
 
There are 20 questions after you enter your ID. All of the questions are required. When 
you are finished, you will automatically be sent back to the main study web site. 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study. 
 
 (1 = Least secure or worst answer, 5 = Most secure or best answer) 
1. Anti-virus software should be installed on all computers.     
        a) True (5)  
        b) False (1) 
        c) Depends if the computer is connected to the Internet (4) 
        d) Depends on who uses the computer (2) 
        e) Anti-virus software is not necessary if the computer has a firewall (3) 
2.Users should change their password to a password protected site every ____?    
        a) day (2) 
        b) week (4) 
        c) month (5) 
        d) 6 months (3)  
        e) year (1) 
3. A strong password is a password that contains which of the following?  
        a) letters (1) 
        b) letters and numbers (3) 
        c) letters and non-numeric characters (4) 
        d) letters, numbers, and non-numeric characters (5) 
        e) upper case and lower case letters (2) 
4. When sharing a file with someone else over the Internet, which one of the following procedures 
should you follow?  
        a) Make sure that you know the person on the receiving end. (5) 
        b) Make sure that you encrypt the information before sharing. (4) 
        c) Never send confidential information over the Internet. (2)  
        d) Don’t upload the information to a shared site. (1) 
        e) Make sure that you review the data before sharing. (3) 
144 
 
5. When opening an email message attachment, you should always do this before opening the 
attachment?  
        a) Make sure that you know the person that sent the email (4) 
        b) Make sure that the attachment is not an executable file (3) 
        c) Open the attachment if it is from an email address within your organization (2) 
        d) Only open if you have scanned it for viruses (5) 
        e) Never open email attachments (1) 
6. If you upload a file to a shared but secured site, it is acceptable to share confidential data as 
long as what is true?  
        a) The file does not contain social security numbers. (3) 
        b) The file contains older data that is not current. (2) 
        c) The file has been approved for viewing by the members of the secured site. (5) 
        d) The file has been properly checked for errors and inconsistencies. (4) 
        e) Never upload confidential data to a shared site, even if it is secure. (1) 
7. Email is the confidential, and cannot be used against an employee, student, etc.  
        a) True (1) 
        b) False (5)  
        c) True, as long as the email is sent using a personal email account. (3) 
        d) False, if the user sends the email from work. (4) 
        e) False, if the user sends the email from a public computer system. (2) 
8. What is the best way to protect your computer, files and data from being infected by a 
computer virus?  
        a) Keep anti-virus software up to date. (5) 
        b) Don’t have a connection to the Internet. (1) 
        c) Don’t download files or open files from any web site. (3) 
        d) Have a firewall installed between your computer and the Internet. (4) 
        e) Keep a backup of all critical software programs. (2) 
9. What is computer phishing?  
        a) The process of looking for confidential data on a remote computer system. (3) 
        b) The process of seeking to gain access to another computer system. (4) 
        c) The fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information. (5) 
        d) The process of passing along a computer virus from one web site to another web site. (2) 
        e) The fraudulent process of trying to steal computer configuration codes. (1) 
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10. Confidential data that is no longer needed or used should be?  
        a) Destroyed when no longer needed or out of date. (4) 
        b) Backed up and stored for later use. (2) 
        c) Stored on a system that is used for archiving purposes. (3) 
        d) Printed out and then destroyed on the computer system. (1) 
        e) Deleted and permanently erased from all computer systems (5) 
11. Which one of the following, in your opinion, is the biggest risk of data sharing on the 
Internet?  
        a) Sharing confidential data on a secure site. (3) 
        b) Sharing non-confidential data on a community site. (1) 
        c) Hackers knowledge of the existence of the community site. (4) 
        d) Sharing confidential data on a community site. (5) 
        e) Sharing executable files on a secure site. (2) 
12. If a member of the information technology group at your organization calls and asks for 
confidential data you should do which one of the following?  
        a) Ask them to provide proof of their identity. (4) 
        b) Provide them with the information they requested in writing. (2) 
        c) Provide them with the information they requested verbally. (1) 
        d) Don’t give them the confidential data, they shouldn’t be asking. (5) 
        e) Ask to speak to their supervisor to verify the necessity of this information. (3) 
13. It is not necessary to have a password on your mobile devices like a PDA (e.g. Palm Pilot), 
cell phone, laptop, etc. since you should always keep these devices in your position or locked 
away?  
        a) True. (1) 
        b) False. (5) 
        c) True, as long as they are kept secure. (3) 
        d) False, since it is impossible to always keep these devices in your position or locked up.(4) 
        e) False, because passwords just make it more difficult to use the devices. (2) 
14. What should you do if you notice someone that you don't know using a co-workers 
computer?  
        a) It is probably just a new person from the IT department, just ignore them. (1) 
        b) Question them and ask why they are there. (5) 
        c) Call the police. (3) 
        d) Get another employee and then approach this person. (4) 
        e) Send an email to the IT department to see if they have an employee working on your co-
workers computer. (2) 
 
146 
 
15. When backing up or making copies of your data which strategy should you follow?  
        a) Back up everything, data and programs. (3) 
        b) Back up only the data that you use on a regular basis. (4) 
        c) Back up data from the My Documents folder only. (1) 
        d) Back up all data at least once, and then changed data as needed. (5) 
        e) Back up all data once per year. (2) 
16. If you discover that a computer security breach has occurred you should?  
        a) Immediately notify your information technology department. (5) 
        b) Shut down your computer so that it is not vulnerable to the breach. (4) 
        c) Call the FBI or other law enforcement agency to report the breach. (1) 
        d) Notify the president of your organization so that they can take appropriate action. (2) 
        e) Run a virus scan on your computer to see if you have been infected with a virus. (3) 
17. How often should data be deleted from a shared web site?  
        a) On a monthly basis. (2) 
        b) When it is no longer regularly used by members of the site. (4) 
        c) It depends on the confidential nature of the data. (3) 
        d) Never, it should be archived and made available. (1) 
        e) When it is no longer relevant to the core mission of the shared web site. (5) 
18. A “strong” password to a shared site should be ___ characters in length.  
        a) 6 (1) 
        b) 8 (2) 
        c) 10 (3) 
        d) 12 (4) 
        e) 14 (5) 
19. To prevent unauthorized access to data on your computer or portable device, you should 
utilize a password and what other computer security practice?  
        a) Set up a VPN connection on your device. (2) 
        b) Make sure that you have a spam filter on the device. (1) 
        c) Utilize the firewall features of the device. (3) 
        d) Encrypt the data on the device. (5) 
        e) Make sure that antivirus software is installed on the device. (4) 
20. What is the average cost of a security breach that involved financial fraud?  
        a) $10,000 per incident. (1) 
        b) $50,000 per incident. (2) 
        c) $100,000 per incident. (3) 
        d) $250,000 per incident. (4) 
        e) $500,000 per incident.  (5) 
147 
 
Post-Training Test 
Answer each of the following questions by selecting the best answer.  
Answer each of the following questions by selecting the letter of the answer that you think is correct.  
Select only one answer for each question (a, b, c, d, or e).   
(1 = Least secure or worst answer, 5 = Most secure or best answer) 
1. What should be installed on all computers to help protect the computers from worms and Trojans? 
        a) Anti-Virus software (5)  
        b) Office software (1) 
        c) Malware software (3) 
        d) Spam filtering software (2) 
        e) Firewall software (4) 
2. How often should you change your password?   
        a) Every 15 days (5) 
        b) Every 6 weeks (4) 
        c) Every 3 months (3) 
        d) Every 6 months (2)  
        e) Once a year (1) 
3. What makes a “strong” password?  
        a) Passwords that are dictionary words (1) 
        b) Passwords that use letters and numbers (3) 
        c) Passwords that use letters and non-numeric characters (4) 
        d) Passwords that use letters, numbers, and non-numeric characters (5) 
        e) Passwords that use upper case and lower case letters (2) 
4. What should you do when you share a file on the Internet?  
        a) Make sure that the person on the receiving end is known to you. (5) 
        b) Encrypt the information before sharing it on the Internet. (4) 
        c) Be careful to never send confidential information over the Internet. (2)  
        d) It is better not to upload information to a shared site. (1) 
        e) Carefully review the data before sharing. (3) 
5. If you receive an email with an attached file, what should you do?  
        a) Identify the person that sent the email (4) 
        b) Make sure that you know the type of file that is attached (3) 
        c) Open the attachment if it is from someone within your organization (2) 
        d) Open the file if you have properly scanned it for viruses (5) 
        e) It is safe to open email attachments (1) 
148 
 
6. Sharing confidential data to a shared Internet site is acceptable if which one of the following is true?  
        a) The file does not contain social security numbers. (3) 
        b) The file contains older data that is not current. (2) 
        c) The file has been approved for viewing by the members of the secured site. (5) 
        d) The file has been properly checked for errors and inconsistencies. (4) 
        e) Never upload confidential data to a shared site, even if it is secure. (1) 
7. Email is the property of the sender, even at work.  
        a) True (1) 
        b) False (5)  
        c) True, as long as the email is sent using a personal email account. (3) 
        d) False, if the user sends the email from work. (4) 
        e) False, if the user sends the email from a public computer system. (2) 
8. How should you protect your computer, files and data from being infected by a computer virus?  
        a) Keep anti-virus software up to date. (5) 
        b) Don’t have a connection to the Internet. (1) 
        c) Don’t download files or open files from any web site. (3) 
        d) Have a firewall installed between your computer and the Internet. (4) 
        e) Keep a backup of all critical software programs. (2) 
9. Computer phishing is the process of doing what?  
        a) The process of looking for confidential data on a remote computer system. (3) 
        b) The process of seeking to gain access to another computer system. (4) 
        c) The fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information. (5) 
        d) The process of passing along a computer virus from one web site to another web site. (2) 
        e) The fraudulent process of trying to steal computer configuration codes. (1) 
10. Data of a confidential nature that is no longer needed or used should be?  
        a) Destroyed when no longer needed or out of date. (4) 
        b) Backed up and stored for later use. (2) 
        c) Stored on a system that is used for archiving purposes. (3) 
        d) Printed out and then destroyed on the computer system. (1) 
        e) Deleted and permanently erased from all computer systems (5) 
11. Which of the following would you say is the biggest risk of data sharing on the Internet?  
        a) Sharing confidential data on a secure site. (3) 
        b) Sharing non-confidential data on a community site. (1) 
        c) Hackers knowledge of the existence of the community site. (4) 
        d) Sharing confidential data on a community site. (5) 
        e) Sharing executable files on a secure site. (2) 
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12. Mary from the information technology calls and asks for confidential data.  What should you tell 
Mary?  
        a) Ask them to provide proof of their identity. (4) 
        b) Provide them with the information they requested in writing. (2) 
        c) Provide them with the information they requested verbally. (1) 
        d) Don’t give them the confidential data, they shouldn’t be asking. (5) 
        e) Ask to speak to their supervisor to verify the necessity of this information. (3) 
13. Passwords are not necessary on mobile devices like a PDA (e.g. Palm Pilot), cell phone, laptop, etc.  Is 
this statement true or false?  
        a) True. (1) 
        b) False. (5) 
        c) True, as long as they are kept secure. (3) 
        d) False, since it is impossible to always keep these devices in your position or locked up. (4) 
        e) False, because passwords just make it more difficult to use the devices. (2) 
14. A person you are not familiar is using one of your co-workers computers that is out sick.  What 
would be the most appropriate course of action for you to take?  
        a) It is probably just a new person from the IT department, just ignore them. (1) 
        b) Question them and ask why they are there. (5) 
        c) Call the police. (3) 
        d) Get another employee and then approach this person. (4) 
        e) Send an email to the IT department to see if they have an employee working on your co-workers 
computer. (2) 
15. What is the most appropriate strategy for backing up your computer data?  
        a) Back up everything, data and programs. (3) 
        b) Back up only the data that you use on a regular basis. (4) 
        c) Back up data from the My Documents folder only. (1) 
        d) Back up all data at least once, and then changed data as needed. (5) 
        e) Back up all data once per year. (2) 
16. What should you do if you discover a computer security breach at your place of work?  
        a) Immediately notify your information technology department. (5) 
        b) Shut down your computer so that it is not vulnerable to the breach. (4) 
        c) Call the FBI or other law enforcement agency to report the breach. (1) 
        d) Notify the president of your organization so that they can take appropriate action. (2) 
        e) Run a virus scan on your computer to see if you have been infected with a virus. (3) 
17. How frequently should data be removed from a shared web site?  
        a) On a monthly basis. (2) 
        b) When it is no longer regularly used by members of the site. (4) 
        c) It depends on the confidential nature of the data. (3) 
        d) Never, it should be archived and made available. (1) 
        e) When it is no longer relevant to the core mission of the shared web site. (5) 
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18. A “strong” password to a shared site should be how many characters in length? 
        a) 6 (1) 
        b) 8 (2) 
        c) 10 (3) 
        d) 12 (4) 
        e) 14 (5) 
19. To help to prevent unauthorized access to data on your computer or portable device, you should use 
a password and?  
        a) Set up a VPN connection on your device. (2) 
        b) Make sure that you have a spam filter on the device. (1) 
        c) Utilize the firewall features of the device. (3) 
        d) Encrypt the data on the device. (5) 
        e) Make sure that antivirus software is installed on the device. (4) 
20. Computer security breaches that involved financial fraud cost on average ____________ per 
incident.  
       a) $100,000 per incident. (4) 
       b) $500,000 per incident. (5) 
       c) $1,000,000 per incident. (3) 
       d) $2,500,000 per incident. (2) 
       e) $5,000,000 per incident.  (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
Week 3 Follow-Up Test 
 
Answer each of the following questions by selecting the letter of the answer that you think is 
correct. Select only one answer for each question. Use the drop down box to the right of each 
question to select your answer (a, b, c, d, or e) 
 
There are 7 questions after you enter your ID. All of the questions are required. When you are 
finished, you will automatically be sent back to the main study web site. 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study. 
1. Joe has been using the same password for that last 6 months. His password is the word scubadiver 
because he is really into scuba diving and his password is easy to remember. What type of password is 
Joe using?   
a) A weak password  (5) 
b) A medium password (4) 
c) A strong password   (2) 
d) A difficult password  (3) 
e) A hack proof password  (1) 
 
2. Julie has recently joined a Virtual Community of Practice for a project she is working on at her 
company. The company has sites located throughout the US, Canada and England. Recently, a new 
member of the community located in England, Mark, has been requesting documents that are 
increasingly confidential in nature. Julie is not comfortable with Mark's latest requests for information. 
What should she do? 
a) Double check the identity of the person making the requests. (4) 
b) Encrypt the information before sharing with Mark using the companies encryption tool  (3) 
c) Don't provide the requested information to Mark.  (5) 
d) Check with the administrator of the virtual community to make sure that the site is secure.  (2) 
e) Ask Mark for more information on why he needs this data.  (1) 
 
3. You receive an email from the systems administrator of the V-CoP asking for your Employee ID and 
your drivers’ license number for verification purposes. You notice the return address seems to be from 
your company. What should you do? 
a) Do not respond to the email – this is probably a phishing attempt.  (5) 
b) Call the system administrator and see if he/she needs that information.  (4) 
c) Send them your employee ID but not your drivers’ license number.  (1) 
d) Ask the systems administrator for more information by responding to the email  (2) 
e) Respond to the email stating that you will not provide the information.  (3) 
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4. Dr. Smith has a desktop computer and a laptop that he uses at work. The laptop he takes home and 
uses on his home network, and he also uses it at conferences and when he is at public sites where he 
can get wireless access. Recently, a local coffee shop has told customers to be weary of using their 
wireless network since some customers have complained about having their computers infected with 
viruses and/or hacked by computer hackers. What should Dr. Smith do to protect his laptop? 
a) Make sure his anti-virus software is always up to date.  (3) 
b) He shouldn't connect to the Internet from the coffee shop.  (5) 
c) He shouldn't download files or open files from the web.  (2) 
d) Make sure that he has a firewall installed on his laptop. (4) 
e) Make sure that he has a backup of all critical software programs.  (1) 
 
5. Dr. Jones, the head of the Biology Department at Central University, received an email from the 
information technology department. The email stated that all employees of Central University needed 
to provide their user account information (login and password) along with other information such as 
email address, home address information, etc. They claim this is part of the project to make sure that 
data is kept secure. How should Dr. Jones respond to this request? The email seems to be from an 
address within the organization. 
a) Respond to the request since it is from an email address from within the University.  (1) 
b) Respond to the request, but don't provide his password.  (2) 
c) Just ignore the email.  (4) 
d) Contact the information services department to see if they sent the email. (5) 
e) Reply to the email and ask the person to provide proof of their identity.  (3) 
 
 
6. Henry has been sending a lot of personal email from work. He is not using his work email system, but 
logs on to Yahoo.com and uses his Yahoo email account. Henry is not happy at his job and has been 
sending negative emails about his boss and the management of the company. Henry doesn't think he 
has anything to worry about since he is not using his work email so it is his property. Is Henry correct? 
a) Yes, it is his account so there is no problem  (3) 
b) Yes, because his employer does not have a legal right to look at messages coming to and from his 
Yahoo account.  (2) 
c) No. Even though Henry is using his private email account, the messages are being sent on the 
company’s network.  (5) 
d) No, email is never private anywhere. (4) 
e) Yes, email is always private.  (1) 
 
7. Employees of Sure-Tight Systems do contract work for the Department of Defense, and a few other 
government agencies. Dr. Tompkins, head of research, maintains copies of all data he is collecting for 
one of the projects on human performance. What method of backup should he follow so that his data is 
not at risk of being lost? 
a) Back up everything on his computer, data and programs.  (2) 
b) Back up only the data that he uses on a regular basis.  (4) 
c) Back up data from his My Documents folder only.  (1) 
d) Back up all data on his computer at least once, and then changed data as needed.  (5) 
e) Back up all of his data once per quarter (every 3 months).  (3) 
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Week 6 Follow-Up Test 
 
Answer each of the following questions by selecting the letter of the answer that you think is 
correct. Select only one answer for each question. Use the drop down box to the right of each 
question to select your answer (a, b, c, d, or e) 
There are 7 questions after you enter your ID. All of the questions are required. When you are 
finished, you will automatically be sent back to the main study web site. 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study. 
1. The IT help desk has called you because they are performing a trace of all data packets that come in 
and out of the corporate network. The employee, Joanne, has asked for your user account name and 
password that you are currently using so that she can map the packets that are coming from and going 
to your computer system. What should you tell Joanne?”  
a) Give her the information since she states she is from the IT department. (1) 
b) Verify that there really is a Joanne that works for the IT department first. (3) 
c) Ask Joanne a couple of questions that only an employee of the company should know. (2) 
d) Don’t give Joanne the information since she should already have that information. (5) 
e) Tell her that you will call her back after you clear this with your supervisor. (4) 
 
2. U State has recently started a virtual community of practice web site for its incoming assistant 
professors. Jean, a recent hire in the fine arts department, has been using the site to see how other 
faculty are handling teaching and research, and related issues.  Another faculty on the site, Jeremy, has 
been asking for examples of exams so that he can get ideas for his tests. Jean doesn't know Jeremy since 
he is on another campus and in another department. What should she do if she decides to share an 
exam with Jeremy?  
a) She should make sure that she verifies Jeremy's identity before sharing. (5) 
b) She should encrypt the information before sharing. (3) 
c) She should not send confidential information over the Internet, even to this site. (4) 
d) She shouldn't upload the information to a shared site. (2) 
e) She should review the data before sharing it with Jeremy. (1) 
 
3. Phyllis has been emailing information to colleagues at the Burun Research Facility in Seattle, WA for 
the past 2 years. She is a research chemist at M State, and has been collecting data on experiments she 
is running in collaboration with Burun. Yesterday, she received an email from a new employee she 
doesn't know at Burun who attached a file that has a new protocol that she is supposed to follow. How 
should she handle this email?  
a) Make sure that she knows the person that sent the email (5) 
b) Make sure that the attachment is not an executable file (4) 
c) Open the attachment if it is from an email address within the organization (1) 
d) Only open the file if she has scanned it for viruses (3) 
e) Never open email attachments (2) 
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4. Georgia State College loans laptop computers to faculty and staff who are on sabbatical, or who need 
to work away from campus or at home. Dr. Wilmer is doing some work for the Department of Defense 
and needs a laptop while he is visiting the Pentagon in Washington, DC. He is a bit concerned about 
using the laptops from the college as they are shared by many different college employees. He has 
heard of some faculty picking up viruses from these shared computers. What would be the most 
effective way to protect his data while using the laptop?  
a) Make sure the anti-virus software is up to date. (5) 
b) He shouldn't connect to the Internet while using the laptop. (2)  
c) He shouldn't download files or open files from any web site. (3) 
d) He should make sure that the laptop has a firewall installed on the computer. (4) 
e) He should make a backup of all critical software programs on the laptop.(1) 
 
5. Y State created a web portal community for faculty to share best practices for teaching and student 
learning strategies. Allen, an active participant of the community, has used the site to get lots of good 
instructional ideas for his classes. Yesterday, he received a phone call from an IT support staff asking for 
his username and password to the site because they need to do maintenance on the site. How should 
Allen respond to this request?  
a) Do not respond to the call – this is probably a phishing attempt. (5) 
b) Call the system administrator and see if he/she really needs that information. (4) 
c) Send his user name, but not his password. (1) 
d) He should ask for more information before responding. (2) 
e) He should respond to the call by stating that he will not provide the information. (3)  
 
6. Eloise is a member of the English Community of Practice shared online site at her college. Part of the 
site requires a username and password to gain access. Eloise has only changed her password once since 
joining 2 years ago. Her current password is 3@CHauCeR3. What type of password is she using?  
a) A weak password (2) 
b) A medium password (4) 
c) An easy password (3) 
d) A strong password (5)  
e) A hack proof password (1)  
 
7. You have been working on some important research for your next major conference in biotechnology. 
You have been saving some of the data to a USB drive, and some to your hard drive. What would be the 
most effective method to follow so that your data is backed up properly?  
a) Back up everything, data and programs (4).  
b) Back up only the data that you use on a regular basis (3).  
c) Back up data from the My Documents folder only. (2) 
d) Back up all data at least once, and then changed data regularly. (5)  
e) Back up all data once per year. (1) 
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Week 9 Follow-Up Test 
 
Answer each of the following questions by selecting the letter of the answer that you think is 
correct. Select only one answer for each question. Use the drop down box to the right of each 
question to select your answer (a, b, c, d, or e) 
 
There are 7 questions after you enter your ID. All of the questions are required. When you are 
finished, you will automatically be sent back to the main study web site. 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study. 
1. Which ONE of the following passwords would you consider to be the strongest? 
a) 1New@PassworD (5) 
b) 23Smith45 (2) 
c) 9@fghl7 (4) 
d) 1newpassword23 (1) 
e) PassWorD23 (3) 
 
2. Your school wants you to participate in a new community of practice that connects teachers with 
interested students to help "mentor" them through their college experience.  A new student named 
Gloria has been assigned to you. You have never met Gloria, but she seems very excited about college 
and learning as much as she possibly can. Recently, Gloria has asked you for personal information - 
where you live, names of your kids, type of car you drive, etc. You don't feel comfortable sharing this 
information, even though you believe Gloria is harmless. How should you handle Gloria's requests? 
a) Make sure that you really know the person on the receiving end. (3) 
b) First ask Gloria to provide personal information to you. (1) 
c) Don't provide Gloria with this information. (5) 
d) Ask Gloria why she wants this information? (4) 
e) As long as the information is not too personal feel free to share. (2) 
Week9-FollowUp 
3. Dr. Fleming has been working remotely over the past 3 months as part of her field work in marine 
biology. She regularly goes to the local library to use their wireless access. However, she is concerned 
that she might pick up a virus since the library does not require secured access to their wireless network 
(anyone can use it). What would be her best method of protecting her computer from getting a virus? 
a) Keep her anti-virus software up to date. (5) 
b) Don’t use the connection to the Internet. (2) 
c) Don’t download files or open files from any web site. (3) 
d) Have a firewall installed on her computer. (4) 
e) Keep a backup of all critical software programs. (1) 
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4. Dr. Holmes is looking for information on biochemical reactions in insects.  He has found a number of 
sites that have appropriate information but one in particular seems to have exactly what he wants. 
However, to access the site he is required to provide personal information that doesn't seem to be 
warranted for what he needs. He thinks this may be a phishing site. What would make him think the site 
is a phishing site? 
a) The site is looking for confidential data on a remote computer system. (4) 
b) The site is seeking to gain access to another computer system. (3) 
c) The site is trying, fraudulently, to attempt to acquire sensitive information. (5) 
d) The site is trying to pass along a computer virus from one web site to another web site. (2) 
e) The site is fraudulently trying to steal computer configuration codes. (1) 
Week9-FollowUp 
5. Jerry is a new employee at your school and is concerned about privacy issues regarding his students 
and their records. He has asked you to respond to concerns about information compromises that have 
occurred at other colleges and universities. He wants to share information with his colleagues but is 
concerned about the safety of this "shared" information.  What would you tell him, in your opinion, is 
the biggest risk of data sharing on the Internet? 
a) Sharing confidential data on a secure site. (4) 
b) Sharing non-confidential data on a community site. (1) 
c) Hackers knowledge of the existence of the community site. (3) 
d) Sharing confidential data on a community site. (5) 
e) Sharing executable files on a secure site. (2) 
 
6. You have been put in charge of making sure that proper backups of data from the virtual community 
of practice in anthropology are being made.  Which one of the following strategies would you 
recommend following? 
a) Back up everything, data and programs. (3) 
b) Back up only the data that you use on a regular basis. (4) 
c) Back up data from the My Documents folder only. (1) 
d) Back up all data at least once, and then changed data as needed. (5) 
e) Back up all data once per year. (2) 
 
7. Dr. Thomas from the chemistry department has received an email from someone in the college. He 
doesn't know this person, but the email states that the attachment is important information regarding 
the schools retirement plan. The email also states that there is time sensitive information in the 
attachment that must be replied to by 5pm today. How should Dr. Thomas respond to this email, or 
what should he do before he opens the attachment? 
a) Make sure that you know the person that sent the email (4) 
b) Make sure that the attachment is not an executable file (3) 
c) Open the attachment if it is from an email address within your organization (2) 
d) Only open if you have scanned it for viruses (5) 
e) Never open email attachments (1) 
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APPENDIX C: DATA COLLECTED DURING RESEARCH STUDY 
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Table 28 – Pre-Training Test Data 
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Table 29 – Post-Training Test Data 
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Table 30 – Final Test Data 
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Table 31 – Computed Confidence Intervals for Test Means 
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APPENDIX D: SIMULATED DATA FOR TESTING KRUSKAL-WALLIS 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
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Below is the sample data used to test the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test.  Scores are based on a 
scale of 1-5, except for Group A the range was from 3-5 for treatment results (assuming that the 
treatments made a significant difference). 
Table 32 – Sample Data for Testing Kruskal-Wallis 
Group A Experimental Group Data range is from 3 - 5           
Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Median 
1 4 3 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 3 4.00 4.00 
2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.50 3.50 
3 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4.20 3.90 
4 5 3 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4.20 4.50 
5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3.70 3.60 
6 3 5 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 3.90 3.90 
7 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 5 4 4.10 4.20 
8 4 5 5 4 3 5 3 3 5 4 4.00 4.30 
9 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 4.20 4.20 
10 4 4 4 3 5 4 3 3 4 4 3.90 3.70 
Mean: 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.90 4.20 4.10 3.80 3.90 4.00 3.90 4.00   
Median: 3.90 4.00 4.20 3.80 4.10 4.20 3.70 3.80 3.90 3.70   3.90 
SD: 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.52 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.76 0.55 0.62   
            
Group B Subject   Control Group                 
Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Median 
1 4 2 3 5 4 1 1 3 5 2 2.9 2.9 
2 5 1 2 5 3 4 2 2 4 3 3.0 2.6 
3 1 4 5 2 1 5 3 4 2 4 3.2 3.2 
4 3 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 5 1 2.4 2.5 
5 3 3 2 2 4 5 3 2 3 3 3.0 3.2 
6 2 3 3 5 3 3 4 1 1 4 2.9 3.3 
7 5 1 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 2.3 2.2 
8 2 1 4 3 3 1 3 2 1 4 2.4 2.3 
9 4 2 2 3 4 3 1 2 4 2 3.0 2.9 
10 4 4 2 2 2 4 5 3 3 1 3.0 2.8 
Mean: 3.2 2.5 2.7 3.4 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.4 3.0 2.7 2.82   
Median: 3.3 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.6 3.4 2.6 2.2 3.0 2.4   2.61 
SD: 1.230 1.015 1.055 1.102 0.958 1.205 1.185 0.975 1.429 1.142 1.129   
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Table 32 – Sample Data for Testing Kruskal-Wallis (cont’d) 
 Group C Subject   Control Group                 
Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Median 
1 3 3 5 5 4 2 3 2 2 3 3.3 3.5 
2 2 5 1 5 2 2 3 2 4 3 3.0 2.6 
3 2 4 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2.0 1.7 
4 4 5 5 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3.2 3.1 
5 3 3 4 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2.9 2.6 
6 5 5 2 2 1 4 4 3 4 3 3.3 3.4 
7 5 2 4 4 4 2 4 3 3 2 3.3 3.5 
8 4 1 2 4 3 5 3 1 5 3 3.2 2.9 
9 3 3 1 2 1 1 4 1 3 2 2.2 1.8 
10 4 2 2 2 3 3 1 3 3 2 2.6 2.5 
Mean: 3.6 3.4 2.9 3.2 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.2 3.1 2.6 2.89  
Median: 3.8 3.4 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.8 3.1 1.9 2.9 2.6  2.84 
SD: 1.014 1.290 1.326 1.162 1.104 1.265 1.007 1.063 1.100 0.608 1.144  
             
             
Group D Subject   Control Group                 
Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Median 
1 4 1 3 2 1 1 3 5 5 3 2.8 2.9 
2 5 5 4 3 1 4 5 3 1 2 3.3 3.4 
3 3 5 1 4 3 3 2 2 1 3 2.7 2.8 
4 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 4 3 4 3.1 3.0 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 4 4 4 2.4 1.4 
6 2 4 3 3 2 1 4 3 3 3 2.9 2.9 
7 4 5 1 4 1 2 2 4 1 3 2.7 2.7 
8 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 4 3 3 3.0 2.9 
9 4 3 3 5 2 5 5 3 2 4 3.5 3.6 
10 5 4 4 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2.6 2.1 
Mean: 3.4 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.0 2.3 3.1 3.5 2.4 3.2 2.90  
Median: 3.7 4.0 3.0 2.9 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.5 2.4 3.1  2.96 
SD: 1.200 1.469 1.226 1.147 0.855 1.190 1.524 0.868 1.271 0.803 1.225  
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Table 33 - Means by Question from Each Group in Simulated Data 
Question Group A Group B Group C Group D 
1 4.0 3.2 3.6 3.4 
2 4.0 2.5 3.4 3.4 
3 4.0 2.7 2.9 2.9 
4 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.8 
5 4.2 2.7 2.3 2.0 
6 4.1 3.1 2.7 2.3 
7 3.8 2.6 3.0 3.1 
8 3.9 2.4 2.2 3.5 
9 4.0 3.0 3.1 2.4 
10 3.9 2.7 2.6 3.2 
Mean 4.0 2.8 2.9 2.9 
 
Table 34 - Ranking of Means from Simulated Data for Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Ranked scores A B C D ABCD 
For Groups A - D 36.5 23.0 30.0 26.5 Combined 
 36.5 7.0 26.5 26.5  
 36.5 11.5 15.5 15.5  
 33.0 26.5 23.0 14.0  
 40.0 11.5 3.5 1.0  
 39.0 20.0 11.5 3.5  
 31.0 8.5 17.5 20.0  
 33.0 5.5 2.0 29.0  
 36.5 17.5 20.0 5.5  
 33.0 11.5 8.5 23.0  
Sum of Ranks 355.0 142.5 158.0 164.5 820.0 
Mean of Ranks 35.5 14.3 15.8 16.45 20.5 
Number of samples 10 10 10 10 40 
 
*Mean value for each test subject in Groups A, B, C, and D for the post-training test questions 
(Table 33).  The rank ordered scores are for the mean from each test subject in the group (Table 
34). 
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The formula below is for the Kruskal-Wallis test which supposes that there are independent 
samples of n1, n2 …nk observations from K populations.  R1, R2,…,Rk is the sum of the ranks for 
the K samples when the sample observations are pooled together and ranked in ascending 
order (Newbold, 2009).  The test of the null hypothesis, Ho, of the equality of the population 
means is based on the statistic: 
K
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For the example data above,  W = 22.13817.   
We then compare the W value to the value obtained from the Chi-Square distribution function, with (K-
1) = 3 degrees of freedom with a 5% significance level test, we find that                 is equal to 10.60.  So 
our W value is significantly higher, which would mean that we would reject the null hypothesis that the 
means are the same and would conclude that the training was significant (which we can see from the 
ranked mean being significantly higher).  Lastly, the KW test procedure is approximately valid, provided 
that the sample contains at least (5) five observations from each sample group (Newbold, 2009).   
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Table 35 – Simulated data results using PhStat2 
Kruskal-Wallis Rank Test for Differences in Medians     
       
Data      
Level of Significance 0.05  Group 
Sample 
Size 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Mean 
Ranks 
   1 10 355 35.5 
Intermediate Calculations  2 10 143 14.3 
Sum of Squared Ranks/Sample Size 19833.4  3 10 158 15.8 
Sum of Sample Sizes 40  4 10 164 16.4 
Number of Groups 4      
       
Test Result      
H Test Statistic 22.12244      
Critical Value 7.814728      
p-Value 6.15E-05      
Reject the null hypothesis        
168 
 
APPENDIX E: TRAINING SYLLABUS 
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A. Demographic Questions:  The demographic questionnaire consists of 20 multiple 
choice questions that the subject completes online by accessing the questionnaire 
via a link that was emailed to them at the beginning of the study period.  The 
demographic questionnaire should not take longer than 10 minutes to complete.  
Appendix B lists the questions for the demographic questionnaire.  Table 36 contains 
a complete listing of all events and their maximum estimated time. 
B. Pre-training test:  The pre-training test takes place after the demographic 
questionnaire.  The pre-training test consists of 20 questions presented in a multiple 
choice format.  The test is to determine the level of knowledge that each subject has 
in the area of computer security, particularly as it relates to an online environment.  
The pre-training test should not take more than 20-30 minutes to complete (see 
Appendix B).  The pilot study helped to determine the actual time that will be 
needed to complete the pre-training test. 
C. Initial training with simulated scenarios:  The initial training with simulated 
scenarios took place 1 - 2 weeks after the pre-training test.  The initial training 
consists of security information presented to the subject about the major areas of 
information and computer security.  Included were simulated events on emails, 
social engineering, phishing and file sharing.  Approximately 20 simulated events 
were presented and took approximately 30-45 minutes to complete.  After the 
training, a post-training test of 10 questions was provided to test the subject on the 
material presented in the initial training with simulated scenarios.  The post-training 
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test takes approximately 10-15 minutes to complete and contains questions that are 
similar in content to the pre-training test to see if the subjects’ awareness of security 
improved based on training and testing.  Appendix F provides some examples of the 
simulated events.  The following information is a draft of the subjects’ training. 
a. A definition of computer security is presented to the subjects along with a list 
of terms that are commonly used in computer security to provide a baseline 
of knowledge.  Included are simulated events that show how security is 
normally breached – such as a user opening an email attachment from an 
unknown sender, and a user providing information to another user that they 
do not check their identity, etc. 
b. Next, the subjects are provided with examples of organizations that have 
been breached by hackers due to routine carelessness on the part of end-
users of the information system.  Examples are listed in Chapter 2.  The 
information is presented in such a way that users are made aware of the 
importance of maintaining security of their system and in their V-CoP 
environment.  The data is presented in an online format and includes 
simulated events that show how some of the breaches are done.  Here are 
some examples: 
i. In a study conducted by the McAfee Corporation, it is projected that 
companies worldwide lost more than $1 trillion to computer security 
breaches in 2008 alone. Also, Forrester Research estimates that an 
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average computer security breach can cost a company between $90 
and $305 per record.  Since most breaches do not just involve tens or 
even hundreds of records, but rather hundreds of thousands or even 
millions of records, the cost of the breach and the cost of repair can 
be in the millions of dollars.  For example, TJX Companies Inc. was 
hacked in 2007 and a reported 46 to 215 million customer records 
were stolen.  The cost to TJX could theoretically be as high as $65 
billion (215 million records at $305 per record).  Questions arise 
about the causes and remedies of these breaches.  In this virtual 
world of computer transactions, how does an organization 
adequately protect its valuable information assets?  The importance 
of proper security procedures and adhering to those procedures is a 
critical component to any system. 
ii. Insider breaches are a major concern of organizations. A temporary 
telecom company employee was arrested on charges of stealing 
personal information and then pocketing more than $70,000 by 
taking out short-term payday loans. Even one of the world's leading 
anti-virus and internet security providers had an international office 
employee steal customers' credit card numbers. Insider breaches will 
continue to be a rising threat for 2010 and beyond, as long as 
companies do not have the proper policies in place to prevent them. 
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iii. 160,000 California university records were hacked at one of 
California's most esteemed universities.  Personal information of 
160,000 current and former students and alumni may have been 
compromised.  These students and alumni are now vulnerable to 
identify theft and other illegal hacking activities. 
iv. Weak passwords are those passwords that are quickly hacked by 
software hacking tools or by good guessing.  One of the easiest ways 
for hackers to gain access to confidential data is through password 
cracking.  For example, an 18-year-old student performed a password 
attack on Twitter by writing a program to do a rapid-fire dictionary 
log-on for the user Crystal, whose name he found frequently in 
Twitter feeds. He thought she was just popular, but in fact she was a 
Twitter staffer. When he got into her account, which had the weak 
password "happiness," he had access to the administrative control 
panel for Twitter, and could change anyone's password. From there it 
was off to the races.  The use of “weak” passwords is unfortunately 
common and very dangerous.  Once a hacker gains access to a 
system, particularly through an account that has administrative (or 
all) privileges, they essentially have access to everything on the 
remote system.  In an online community, this means they can delete 
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accounts, download sensitive data, create new accounts, take down 
the system, delete everything, and more. 
D. Simulated Security Training and Testing:  Approximately 3, 6, and 9 weeks after the 
initial training with simulated scenarios event, follow up simulated security training 
and testing takes place.  Subjects involved in this phase (Groups A and B) receive 
another email telling them where to go to complete the brief training and testing.  
Approximately 10 simulated scenarios with questions are included in this phase of 
the research.  The event takes approximately 20 minutes to complete.  See Appendix 
F for examples of the training and testing.  An example is listed below. 
a. The subject is presented with the following screen, and will have to change 
their password using a password that they believe is a strong password.  The 
system then displays their password, and asks if it is strong in context of the 
definition, which is displayed with their password.  They then have to answer 
a question that lists a group of passwords and they are to select the 
password they believe to be appropriate based on strength of the password 
and usability. 
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Figure 42 – Simulated Example Event 
 
E. Final Test and Interview:  Approximately 10 weeks after the initial training with 
simulated scenarios, and after the last simulated security training and testing event, 
a final test is performed on all groups to measure the learning from the training and 
testing, or from the pre-training test alone.  The final test takes approximately 15-20 
minutes to complete.  Interviews might have been conducted if certain subjects 
have skewed responses or scores.  The interviews would have been done over the 
phone or via email. 
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Table 36 - Maximum Estimated Training with simulated scenarios and Testing Time 
 Maximum Estimated Time in Minutes for Each Event 
Event Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
15 15 15 15 
Pre-Training Test 20 20 20  
Initial Training 30  30  
Post-Training Test 20 20 20  
4th Week Simulated 
security testing and 
training 
30 30   
7th Week Simulated 
security testing and 
training 
30 30   
10th Week Simulated 
security testing and 
training 
30 30   
Final Test 
And Interviews 
20 20 20 20 
Total Estimated 
Time for All Events 
195 min 
 
165 min 105 min 35 min 
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLES OF TRAINING WITH SIMULATED SCENARIOS AND 
TESTING EVENTS 
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Sample of Training with simulated scenarios and Testing 
1. The subject is presented with a simulated (web interface) email message with an 
attached file named Information.zip.  The email message states that the file is 
information that they requested from another member of the V-CoP.  The email 
appears to be from a legitimate member of the V-CoP and the return email address 
seems valid.  Attempts will be made to get the subject to click on the file 
attachment.  If they click on the file attachment they will get a simulated error 
message stating that they have been infected by a virus.  Immediately after their 
response, they will be presented with a multiple choice question asking them about 
the most secure way to respond to the previous email attachment simulation. 
 
Figure 43 – Sample Email Simulated Event 
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2. The subject is presented with a link to a recorded voice message that asks them to 
provide their username and password to the IT department.  The IT staff person, 
Susan, says that they are testing the network and need to verify the data packets 
traveling across the network.  The subject is asked to respond to the simulated 
“person’s voice” by answering a question on what information they should provide 
to Susan.  Here is what the voice would say:  “Hey Joe, this is Susan from the 
technology department on campus.  We are testing the network and we need to 
make sure that the data we are verifying is from your computer.  I know that your 
user name is jsmith, and you are using what password with your account?  Once we 
check the network we will reset your password and email you your new password.  
This should only take a couple of minutes.  Thanks again.  We really appreciate your 
help Susan.” 
3. The next simulation will be of a list of files that are posted to the V-CoP site.  One of 
the files is a Pilot-Test.ZIP file that was posted by an apparent member of the V-CoP 
and has a note next to it stating “Results from chemistry pre-training test pilot 
program”.  The members have been working on this and are looking forward to 
seeing if the pre-training test for student self-assessment was effective.  The file was 
actually uploaded by someone who hacked into the V-CoP and placed the file there 
after reading about the project for the chemistry pre-training test pilot program.  If 
the user clicks on the file, it will state that it is a virus and their computer has been 
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infected.  They will then be immediately asked a question about what they should 
do next to solve the problem, based on the most secure response. 
 
Figure 44 – Sample Potential Virus File 
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4. Another simulation would be related to password security.  The subject would be 
prompted to change their password.  After they enter their new password, they 
would be presented with a question that asks them to identify the strongest 
password from a choice of five alternatives.  The password they entered will be 
presented to them and they can compare their selection with the choices in the 
question.   
 
Figure 45 – Sample Password Simulation 
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APPENDIX G: POTENTIAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
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Potential Interview Questions 
Note:  Interviews of some subjects would have been conducted based on irregularities or 
skewed responses from a particular test subject or targeted at the treatment group to get 
further feedback on the effectiveness of the training with simulated scenarios and how it would 
affect their future behavior.  Some example interview questions were developed and include 
the following. 
 
1. How did the computer security training change your perception of sharing data in a virtual 
community? 
2. How would you rate your awareness of computer security before and after your involvement in 
this research? 
3. Even though you did not receive pre-training in computer security your responses to the pre – 
and post-training test were different.  What would you attribute this change in responses? 
 
4. What changes would you recommend to the training that you received in the initial training 
event, and the subsequent intermittent events at 3, 6, and 9 weeks? 
 
5. Were the questions and training events easy to understand and apply?  Why or why not? 
 
6. How will you change, if any, your behaviors as it relates to computer security in your 
organization?  
 
7. What changes do you think need to be made to the security awareness policies at your 
organization?   
 
8. Would you recommend this training to others at your organization?  Why or why not? 
 
9. In what ways can your organization better serve its employees in the area of information 
security and awareness? 
 
10. Are there any other comments or suggestions that you have about this training system? 
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APPENDIX H: IRB INFORMED CONSENT 
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Measuring the Effect of Using Simulated Security Awareness Training and Testing on 
Members of Virtual Communities of Practice. 
Informed Consent 
 
Principal Investigator(s): Craig L. Tidwell, Doctoral Student 
 
Sub-Investigator(s): N/A 
 
Faculty Supervisor: Charles Reilly, PhD 
 
Investigational Site(s): Online, via the Internet 
 
Introduction: Researchers at the University of Central Florida (UCF) study many topics. To do 
this we need the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. You are being invited 
to take part in a research study which will include about 20-40 people from UCF. You have been 
asked to take part in this research study because you are a teacher and are involved in a virtual 
community of practice (Curriculum Alignment group). You must be 18 years of age or older to 
be included in the research study. 
 
The person doing this research is Craig L. Tidwell of UCF College of Engineering and Computer 
Science, Modeling and Simulation PhD program.  Because the researcher is a graduate student, 
he is being guided by Dr. Charles Reilly, a UCF faculty supervisor in the College of Engineering 
and Computer Science. 
 
What you should know about a research study: 
Someone will explain this research study to you. 
A research study is something you volunteer for. 
Whether or not you take part is up to you. 
You should take part in this study only because you want to. 
You can choose not to take part in the research study. 
You can agree to take part now and later change your mind. 
Whatever you decide it will not be held against you. 
Feel free to ask all the questions you want before you decide. 
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Purpose of the research study: The purpose of this study is to measure the effect of simulated web-
based training and testing on information security awareness over a 12 week period. 
 
What you will be asked to do in the study: You will be randomly assigned (like the flip of a 
coin) to 1 of 4 groups. Your selection will be random based on the total number of participants, 
equally distributed between the 4 groups to create groups of equal size.   
 
You will be asked to take part in the research by answering questions related to information 
security.  Depending on the group you are assigned to, you may be asked to take information 
security training with simulated scenarios at specified intervals, take a pre and post-training test 
to measure the effect of the simulated information security training and testing, and respond to 
possible interview questions at the end of the study. Each segment of the study should not take 
more than 30 minutes to complete. 
 
Time Frame Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Start Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
Start Pre-training test Pre-training test Pre-training test  
1-2 weeks Simulated 
Security 
Awareness 
Training and 
Post-training test 
Post-training test Simulated 
Security 
Awareness 
Training and 
Post-training test 
 
3 weeks Simulated 
Security Testing 
and Training 
Simulated 
Security Testing 
and Training 
  
6 weeks Simulated 
Security Testing 
and Training 
Simulated 
Security Testing 
and Training 
  
9 weeks Simulated 
Security Testing 
and Training 
Simulated 
Security Testing 
and Training 
  
10 weeks Final Test 
(Interviews) 
Final Test 
(Interviews) 
Final Test 
(Interviews) 
 Final Test 
(Interviews) 
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Below is the table of events and then a table of time for each event: 
 
 Maximum Estimated Time in Minutes for Each Event 
Event Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Demographic 
Questionnaire 
15 15 15 15 
Pre-training test 20 20 20  
Initial Training 30  30  
Post-training test 20 20 20  
4th Week Simulated security 
testing and training 
30 30   
7th Week Simulated security 
testing and training 
30 30   
10th Week Simulated security 
testing and training 
30 30   
Final Test And Interviews 20 20 20 20 
Total Estimated Time for All 
Events 
195 min 165 min 105 min 35 min 
 
You do not have to answer every question or complete every task. You will not lose any benefits 
if you skip questions or tasks. 
 
Location: The entire research will be conducted online in a web-based environment. Participants 
in the study will be given a sign-on number and password to take part in the study at its start. 
 
Time required: There will be a maximum of 5 online sessions that will last approximately 30 
minutes over the 12 week period. All sessions will be done online through the Internet. 
 
Audio or video taping: This study does not include any audio or video taping. 
  
Risks: There are no expected risks for taking part in this study. You do not have to answer every 
question or complete every task. You will not lose any benefits if you skip questions or tasks. 
You do not have to answer any questions that make you feel uncomfortable. 
 
Benefits: You may benefit from this research. You may become more aware of information 
security risks and procedures for dealing with these risks. 
 
 
 
  
 
 University of Central Florida IRB 
 IRB NUMBER: SBE-10-06708 
 IRB APPROVAL DATE: 3/23/2010 
 IRB EXPIRATION DATE: 3/22/2011 
187 
 
Compensation or payment: There is no compensation or other payment to you for taking part in this 
study. There is no compensation, payment or extra credit for taking part in this study. 
 
It is possible, however, that if you are a student involved in the pilot study, you may earn extra 
credit for your participation, but this benefit is at the discretion of the instructor. If you choose 
not to participate, you may notify your instructor and ask for an alternative assignment of equal 
effort for equal credit. There will be no penalty for not participating. 
 
Confidentiality: Your identity will be kept confidential. The researcher will make every effort to 
prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or 
what that information is. For example, your name will be kept separate from the information you 
give, and these two things will be stored in different places. 
 
Your information will be combined with information from other people who took part in this 
study.  When the researcher writes about this study to share what was learned with other 
researchers, he will write about this combined information. Your name will not be used in any 
report, so people will not know how you answered or what you did. 
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or think the research has hurt you, talk to Craig L. Tidwell, Doctoral 
Graduate Student, Modeling and Simulation, College of Engineering and Computer Science, (407) 221-
2073 or Dr.Charles Reilly, Faculty Supervisor, Department of Industrial Engineering and Management 
Systems at (407) 823-5306 or by email at creily@mail.ucf.edu. 
. 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the 
University of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of 
the Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. You may also talk to them for any of the following: 
Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team. 
You cannot reach the research team. 
You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
You want to get information or provide input about this research. 
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Withdrawing from the study: If you decide to leave the research, data will not be made 
available to complete the research study and will impact the final results. If you decide to leave 
the study, contact the investigator so that the investigator can make sure that you are removed 
from the pool of subjects. The person in charge of the research study or the sponsor can remove 
you from the research study without your approval. The sponsor can also end the research study 
early. We will tell you about any new information that may affect your health, welfare or choice 
to stay in the research. 
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